A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement by Martimort, David et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Theory of Contracts With Limited
Enforcement
David Martimort and Aggey Semenov and Lars Stole
7 February 2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53504/
MPRA Paper No. 53504, posted 25 February 2014 08:31 UTC
Working paper
A THEORY OF CONTRACTS WITH LIMITED ENFORCEMENT1
IN PROGRESS. DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION.
September 28, 2013
David Martimort, Aggey Semenov and Lars Stole
Abstract. We present a Theory of Contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a
dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on
his persistent cost at the outset. Public enforcement relies on remedies for breach. Private
enforcement comes from severing relationships. We first characterize aggregate enforcement
constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly. Whether a long-
term contract is enforceable does not depend on the distribution of penalties for breach be-
tween the buyer and the seller. While under complete information, the optimal contract would
remain stationary, non-stationarity might arise under asymmetric information. Enforcement
constraints are time-dependent and easier to satisfy as time passes. Indeed, a high-cost seller
may be tempted to trade high volumes at high prices at the beginning of the relationship
before breaching the contract later on. Yet, such take-the-money-and-run strategy becomes
less attractive as time passes and can be prevented with backloaded payments. The optimal
contract thus goes through two different phases. First, quantities and prices increase at the
inception of the relationship. Later on, the contract looks more stationary. The public and
private sides of enforcement plays different roles in determining the length of the earlier phase
of contracting. Long-run screening distortions encapsulate the quality of enforcement, offering
de facto a link between the quality of the legal system and contractual performances.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, enforcement, breach of contracts, dynamic contracts.
1. INTRODUCTION
Motivation. The Theory of Contracts is by now a major building block of our current
understanding of how markets and organizations perform. From a theoretical viewpoint,
its formidable contribution is to allow a full characterization of trading possibilities in
environments where privately informed parties might have conflicting interests. Equipped
with such a description of the set of incentive feasible allocations (Myerson, 1982), model-
ers might first optimize institutions, organizations and contractual forms and then discuss
practical implementation. Although quite successful, this paradigm remains surprisingly
mute to explain what sorts of contractual agreements are enforced in practice. At best,
economists allude to the mere presence of Courts of Law with crude enforcement capa-
bilities in the background of the contracting environment they entertain.1 This view of
1For helpful comments on earlier versions of this work, we thank seminar and conference participants at
the Canadian Economic Theory 2011 Meeting in Toronto, the Canadian Economic Association 2012 in
Calgary, the 2013 Workshop on Conflict and Cooperation in Bergamo, the 2013 conference on “Contracts,
Procurement, and Public-Private Arrangements” in Florence, Sciences Po Paris. All remaining errors
are our own. Special thanks to Sandeep Baliga, Sergei Guriev, Marco Ottavianni, Marco Pagnozzi and
Nicola Pavoni for helpful discussions on earlier versions.
aParis School of Economics-EHESS, david.martimort@parisschoolofeconomics.eu.
bUniversity of Ottawa, aggey.semenov@uottawa.ca.
cUniversity of Chicago Booth School of Business,lars.stole@chicagobooth.edu.
1 To illustrate, that some investment/action remains non-verifiable by Courts is a key ingredient
not only for the infamous hold-up model which is a basic tenet for both Transaction Costs Economics
(Williamson, 1985) and the Property Rights literature (Hart, 1995) but also for the moral hazard leg of
the Agency literature (Hart and Holmstro¨m, 1985).
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contracts somewhat somewhat contrasts with the perspective taken by Law scholars who
actually devote much effort in studying the crucial role played by Courts in enforcing and
implementing contracts.2 Instead, a view broadly shared by economists is that, if any
frictions impede contractual performances, those frictions only come from asymmetric
information and/or transaction costs, not from the limited ability of Courts in enforcing
contracts.
This view implies that received Contract Theory suffers from at least two loopholes. The
first weakness of the paradigm challenges its relevance for other fields of social sciences.
Contract Theory as it stands cannot draw any precise link between the quality of legal
environments and contractual performances. This sharply contrasts with much empirical
evidence. In a series of seminal papers, La Porta and al. (1998) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) demonstrated that the quality of the legal system has a significant impact on
transactions in financial, labor and output markets, and is thus a significant determinant
of growth and development. Taking an even broader perspective, historians, political
scientists (Tilly 2007, Fukuyama 2004) and some economists as well (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2005) emphasized that the enforcement of contracts and regulations is a key
ingredient in building state capacities both across space and over history.
The second weakness of received theory is more internal to the field. That Contract
Theory cannot account for imperfections of the legal system certainly provides a by far
too ideal view of contract design. First, it is not clear a priori how much of the received
lessons persist when enforcement is costly. Second, a richer set of comparative statics and
correlations may emerge from a theory that links the quality of enforcement with more
standard agency distortions.
To contribute on those fronts, this paper develops a theory of contracting with costly
enforcement when parties may renege on their contractual duties and Courts have limited
remedies against breaches. Our goal is then to link the standard screening distortions
which are now well-known in asymmetric information contexts to parameters character-
izing the quality of enforcement.
Set-up and main results. Consider a highly stylized model of a relationship between
an uninformed buyer (the principal, or she in the sequel) and a seller (the agent, he) who
repeatedly trade for the delivery of a good or service. The seller has private information
on his cost parameter. This type is persistent over the whole relationship. The buyer
has all bargaining power in designing a long-term contract. Parties can fully commit to
a sequence of trades specifying prices and quantities over time.
From the seminal work of Baron and Besanko (1984), the optimal dynamic contract
in this context is known to be stationary, repeating in each period the one-shot optimal
contract. Such contract trades off the efficiency gains of large productions with the cost
of leaving information rent to the informed seller had he produced such volumes.3
2This view is probably best expressed by Masten (1999) who wrote: “..., the literatures on contract
design and contract enforcement have largely developed independently of one another. Economic theories
of contracting, for the most part, give little explicit attention to enforcement issues, the presumption being
that courts will see to it (subject only to verifiability constraints) that whatever terms contracting parties
arrive at are fulfilled. Indeed, enforcing contracts as written is the court’s only function in mainstream
contract theory [...] This judicial deference to contracts in economic theory contrasts with the far more
intrusive role of courts in economic analyses of contract law, in which courts are called on to adjudicate
disputes, fill gap and devise and implement default rules.”
3See Baron and Myerson (1982), and Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 2) for some textbook
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Slightly departing from this well-known setting, suppose now that this long-term rela-
tionship is subject to bilateral opportunism. The contract can be breached at any point
in time by either party. For instance, the buyer may behave opportunistically and fail to
fulfill her payment obligations following delivery while, on his side, the seller may pocket
any advance payments and not deliver the requested output.
Contracts should now structure the relationship to reduce such bilateral opportunism
and ensure that, any point of time, parties prefer to stick to their contractual obligations
rather than deviating. The issue at the core of our analysis is thus to understand how to
enforce the actual play of a contract when Courts of Law can only use limited remedies.
As recognized by Law scholars, the enforcement of contracts relies on two complemen-
tary devices. In his classic text, Atiyah (1995, Chapter 22) reports that “Contract Law
provides a battery of remedies as sanctions against those who breach contracts. ..)..The
chief legal remedies for breach of contractual duties are recessions or terminations of con-
tracts and an action for remedies for the financial loss occasioned by the breach.” If a
party does not fulfill his contractual obligations, this party may first pay punitive reme-
dies for such breach. This public side of enforcement captures the idea that Courts view
contract breaches as externalities on traders that must certainly be corrected. Second,
trade may just be stopped following a breach. This stigma captures the private side of
enforcement which, by definition, can only be analyzed in a full-fledged dynamic context.
The dynamic framework we propose in this paper allows us to analyze how those two
enforcement devices interact and altogether shape contract design.
Enforcement constraints. Even when taken in tandem, the private and public sides of
enforcement may fail to ensure perfect enforceability. This is so when the perspective
of future trading rounds may not suffice to motivate parties to abide to their current
obligations or remedies have not been well-designed by Courts. A first step of our analysis
thus consists in deriving enforcement constraints ensuring that both the seller and the
buyer abide to the contract. Intuitively, the seller is ready to deliver the requested output
only if pre-delivery payments are not too large. Instead, the buyer is ready to pay the
requested price for service if, on the contrary, post-delivery payments are not too large.
When traders have quasi-linear payoffs, individual enforcement constraints can be
pooled into a single forward-looking aggregate enforcement constraint. For each real-
ization of the seller’s cost, the foregone benefits of future trades plus the overall remedies
paid following a breach by either party must be large enough to ensure compliance.4 This
pooling procedure does not depend on whether there is asymmetric information or not
even though details differ. It just follows from the possibility to structure within each pe-
riod of the relationship pre-delivery and post-delivery prices so that enough instruments
are available to curb opportunism by both parties.
presentation.
4In the mechanism design literature, it is a standard to trick to pool altogether incentive and partic-
ipation problems through an aggregate feasibility condition that applies broadly in environments with
multilateral incentive problems. See, among others, Myerson and Sattherwaite (1983) in bargaining con-
texts and Laffont and Maskin (1982) and Mailath and Postelwaite (1990) in public good environments.
To be feasible, a contract must generate enough surplus beyond the costs of inducing information reve-
lation by all privately informed parties. In the present context, the bilateral incentive problems comes
from the ability of either party to breach the contract. In the relational contracting literature which is
closer to our framework, pooling incentives on both sides of the relationship is also a common feature as
it was shown by Levin (2003) in a different informational context.
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Neutrality of the distribution of remedies. It follows from this pooling procedure that ag-
gregate enforcement constraints do not depend on the distribution of punitive remedies
between the buyer and the seller but only on their sum. Following a Coasean argument,
the exact distribution of breach remedies has no impact. The buyer, who has all bar-
gaining power, can undo any initial distribution and structure payments so as to fully
internalize the consequences of a breach even when it might originate from the seller.
“Take the money and run”. Aggregate enforcement constraints take different forms de-
pending on whether contracting occurs under complete or asymmetric information. Under
complete information, those constraints only impose a non-negativity condition on the
enforcement surplus : The value of future trades must cover the benefits of breaches by ei-
ther party. This condition does not depend directly on time but only indirectly so because
at different dates different trading volumes and prices might have been stipulated.
Under asymmetric information, a first important novelty is that the value of future
trades must be even greater to ensure enforcement. Future surplus must cover the conse-
quences of the new strategic possibilities that are now available to the privately informed
seller. The buyer must concede some information rent to the most efficient seller to in-
duce information revelation. With imperfect enforcement, those large payments become
attractive even for a high-cost seller who may just mimic efficient trades for a while before
reneging on his obligations.
This take-the-money-and-run strategy is a fundamental feature of the asymmetric in-
formation environment. By construction, it is time dependent. As time passes, that
strategy becomes less and less attractive for a high-cost seller. At the extreme, always
mimicking an efficient type would just contradict incentive compatibility. After enough
trading rounds, the enforcement problem then looks like under complete information.5
Optimality of non-stationary contracts. Under complete information, time plays no role
in writing enforcement constraints. A rough intuition might thus suggest that the opti-
mal contract is then stationary. Such result is far from obvious. Relaxing enforcement
constraints indeed calls for reducing current prices and volumes so that the current ben-
efits of not delivering the good for the seller or of not paying for the service for the buyer
diminish. At the same time, increasing future volumes maximizes future surplus and
helps also to prevent opportunism by making future trading periods attractive. Because
of those conflicting forces, the proof of stationary is somewhat involved, obliging us to
import tools for optimization problems with infinite constraints that were developed in
the macro economics literature.6 Of course, this stationary contract still accounts for the
possibility that enforcement constraints might bind.
Under asymmetric information, time plays now a key role thanks to the existing take-
the-money-and-run strategy that pertains to such environment. Making such strategy less
attractive requires to backload the low-cost seller’s payments. The optimal contract is no
longer stationary but goes through two different phases. In the first growing phase, trading
volumes and payments increase over time as the high-cost seller’s incentives to renege
progressively vanish. In a more mature phase, outputs and prices become stationary. Yet,
they differ from those obtained when contracts are a priori restricted to be stationary by
5Construction contracts offer well-known examples where such take-the-money-and-run strategy
is pervasive. For anecdotical evidence see for instance http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-
documentid=20741445.
6See Rustichini (1998) and Marcet and Marimon (2011).
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means of less significant distortions. As time goes on, enforcement constraints have less
bite and back-loading payments and volumes becomes less attractive.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the
set of allocations that are incentive feasible and enforceable, either under complete or
asymmetric information. Section 4 shows that the optimal contract is stationary under
complete information. Section 5 characterizes the optimal contract in the case of asym-
metric information and provides conditions for their non-stationarity. Section 7 discusses
the robustness of our findings under various scenarios. Section 8 draws some implications
of our findings for organization theory and, more specifically, for the Theory of the Firm.
Section 9 concludes with a review of the literature that puts our findings into perspective.
Proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Basics
Preferences. We consider an infinitely repeated relationship between a buyer (the
principal sometimes referred as she in the sequel) and a seller (the agent or he) who
provides a service or good on her behalf. Time is indexed by τ = 0, 1, ...,∞ and we
denote by δ > 1 the common discount factor.
A trade profile stipulates an infinite array of payments and (non-negative) outputs
(t,q) ≡ {(tτ , qτ )}τ=0,..,∞ over this long-term relationship. Both the buyer and the seller
have quasi-linear utility functions defined over trade profiles. Their per-period average
payoffs are respectively given by:
(1− δ)
∞∑
τ=0
δτ (S(qτ )− tτ ) and (1− δ)
∞∑
τ=0
δτ (tτ − θqτ ).
The principal’s gross surplus function S is increasing and strictly concave (S ′ > 0 > S ′′)
with S(0) = 0 and S ′(0) < +∞. To ensure positive outputs under all circumstances
below (even under asymmetric information and limited enforcement), we also assume
that S ′(0) is not too small.
Information. Our goal is to study how screening possibilities interact with limits on
enforcement. The seller has thus private information about his cost parameter θ which is
persistent over the whole relationship but drawn once for all before contracting. The set
of possible cost values is Θ = {θ, θ} (with ∆θ > 0). Let denote by ν > 0 (resp. 1−ν > 0)
the probability that the seller has a low (resp. high) cost.7
2.2. Mechanisms and Costless Enforcement
As a benchmark, consider the simple case where enforcement is costless.
Complete information. Under complete information, it is routine to show that the
first-best outcome entails a stationary payment-output pair (tfb(θ), qfb(θ)) (or a station-
ary rent-output pair (U fb(θ), qfb(θ))) defined respectively as:
S ′
(
qfb(θ)
)
= θ and U fb(θ) = tfb(θ)− θqfb(θ) = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ.
7The case of a continuum of types is analyzed in Section 7.2.
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The first condition just states that marginal surplus must be equal to marginal cost
while the second shows that the seller’s rent is fully extracted.When enforcement is cost-
less, this allocation is repeated in each period of the relationship.
Asymmetric information. Under full commitment, Baron and Besanko (1984) have
shown that the Revelation Principle applies in such dynamic trading environment. There
is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to direct and truthful revelation mech-
anisms that stipulate the seller’s payments and outputs in each period as a function of
his upfront report on cost. Such contract is an infinite sequence: C = {(t(θ),q(θ))}θ∈Θ.
A second important insight due to Baron and Besanko (1984) is that the optimal long-
term contract is the infinite replica of the static optimal contract. The latter entails
first-best production for the low-cost seller and the usual Baron-Myerson distortion for
the high-cost seller’s output qbm(θ):
S ′(qbm(θ)) = θ +
ν
1− ν∆θ.
Under asymmetric information, the buyer’s marginal surplus must equal the seller’s
virtual cost θ + ν
1−ν∆θ which is above true cost. A downward output distortion of the
high-cost seller reduces the information rent left to the low-cost type. As familiar in such
screening environments, the rents for both types are expressed as:
U bm(θ) = ∆θqbm(θ) > U bm(θ) = 0.
Among other possible payments profiles that may implement this allocation, the following
stationary prices offer a convenient benchmark for the rest of the analysis:
tbm(θ) = θqfb(θ) + ∆θqbm(θ) and tbm(θ) = θqbm(θ).
2.3. Costly Enforcement: Setting up the Stage
Parties can fully commit to a long-term contract stipulating a trade profile. Yet, at
any date, the mere play of this mechanism may be subject to opportunistic breaches by
either side. A trader breaches the contract at a given date if the current benefits of doing
so exceeds the cost. This cost includes the foregone opportunities for future trades (the
private side of enforcement) but also the legal remedies that this party may have to pay
(the public side of enforcement). A contract stipulates prices and quantities that will be
traded in any given period but trade itself is at risk.8
To control those opportunistic behaviors, it is important to distinguish, for each date
τ , between a pre-delivery and a post-delivery sub-period. The buyer pays t1,τ before any
production takes place and an additional payment t2,τ after delivery. Having the buyer
pay before production helps controlling her own incentives for breach. Instead post-
trading payments help controlling the seller who could be tempted not to deliver the good
8 By assuming full commitment, we leave aside the issue of renegotiation which is well-known from
the existing literature (Dewatripont 1989, Hart and Tirole 1988 and Rey and Salanie´ 1993). In that
literature, the only breach of an initial long-term contract comes from the possibility that a party offers
a Pareto-improving new contract as information has been revealed by earlier performances. This issue
is orthogonal to the enforcement problem that is at the core of our analysis.
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as requested.9,10 A direct mechanism is now an infinite triplet C = {(t1(θ), t2(θ),q(θ))}θ∈Θ
stipulating pre- and post-trading payments as well as outputs in each period. The total
payment to a seller reporting a type θ is thus tτ (θ) = t1,τ (θ) + t2,τ (θ) at date τ .
Equipped with those notations, let us see in more details how parties may behave
opportunistically and deviate from the expected play of the mechanism.
Seller’s breach. After having pocketed the pre-delivery payment t1,τ (θ), the seller may
not deliver the quantity qτ (θ).
11 This deviation is attractive if t1,τ (θ) is large enough.
Buyer’s breach. After the delivery of a quantity qτ (θ), the buyer may not pay the post-
delivery price t2,τ (θ) if this payment is now too large.
Let thus denote by K ≥ 0 and L ≥ 0 the remedies that apply respectively to the
buyer and the seller in case of a breach. Those penalties are exogenously specified
by Courts.12 Even though our characterization of enforceable contracts will focus on
individual breaches,13 it will nevertheless be useful to define the aggregate remedy as
M = K + L.14
Timing. The following timing summarizes how the contracting game unfolds.
1. At date τ = 0−, the seller learns his cost parameter θ. The buyer offers the
mechanism C. The seller accepts or rejects in which case parties receive their
reservation values normalized to zero. If he accepts, the seller reports a type θˆ.
2. Each trading period at date τ ≥ 0 then unfolds as follows:
• The buyer offers the pre-delivery payment t1,τ (θˆ);
• The seller produces qτ (θˆ) or breaches the contract in which case he must pay
the remedy L;
• If qτ (θˆ) is produced as required, the post-delivery payment t2,τ (θˆ) is paid by
the buyer or she breaches the contract and pays the remedy K.
9Our interest for details of the technology of the trading process within each period and the opportuni-
ties that this trading process opens for opportunistic behavior is, at a rough level, similar to Beaudry and
Poitevin (1995) and Watson (2007). Those authors argue that technological details shape contracting in
environments with limited commitment.
10 For simplicity, we assume that there is no discounting between those sub-periods.
11 An alternative interpretation is that the good might come under two different levels of nonverifiable
quality. Producing the low-quality good does not cost anything but is also of no value for the buyer.
12This may be justified for instance when those penalties apply under broad circumstances and are
not optimized for the specific transaction under scrutiny. A justification could be that the Court retains
little discretion in setting those penalties in any specific context because of imperfect information on
the value of the transaction. Another motivation for keeping those remedies fixed is that they may have
chosen ex ante by the contracting parties themselves at a stage where, again, they may find it hard to
even assess gains from trade. Among others, Shavell (1980, 1984), Konakayama et al. (1986) and Edlin
(1996) investigate optimal level of remedies.
13We focus on each party’s individual incentives for breach given he expects the other to behave.
14When remedies are infinite (K = L = +∞), the optimal contract is of course the infinite replica of
the Baron-Myerson allocation. This can be viewed as a stylized modeling of a perfect enforcement system.
To focus on less trivial cases, we will thus implicitly assume that penalties are finite (K,L < +∞).
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Following breach by either party, the contract is terminated.15
Notations. In order to express various feasibility constraints in compact form, we now
define the per-period average value of the seller’s output, his rent and the buyer’s payoff
going forward from date τ respectively as:
qτ (θ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsqτ+s(θ),
U τ (θ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δs(tτ+s(θ)− θqτ+s(θ)),
V τ (θ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δs (S(qτ+s(θ))− tτ+s(θ)) .
We may also define the seller’s backward output and per-period average rent till date
τ ≥ 0 respectively as: 16
q
τ
(θ) = (1− δ)
τ−1∑
s=0
δsqs(θ),
U τ (θ) = (1− δ)
τ−1∑
s=0
δs(ts(θ)− θqs(θ)) + δτ (1− δ)(t1,τ (θ)− L).17
Stationary contracts. For future references, it is useful to describe in more details
stationary contracts. Those contracts specify payments and outputs that are constant
over time. A stationary contract is thus of the form:
ti,τ (θ) ≡ ti(θ) (i = 1, 2), qτ (θ) ≡ q(θ) ∀τ, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
The seller’s per-period rent U(θ) and the buyer’s per period payoff V (θ) remain constant
with such contract and are respectively equal to:
U(θ) ≡ U0(θ) and V (θ) ≡ V 0(θ).
From Baron and Besanko (1984), we already know that restricting the analysis to sta-
tionary contracts is without loss of generality when enforcement is costless. Beyond,
stationary contracts remain of particular interest. First, stationary contracts might some-
times be the only feasible agreements when, for instance, contracting periods cannot be
specified a priori.18 Second, stationarity may be required if the buyer starts trading with
several potential sellers at different points in time and no third-price discrimination across
sellers is possible. Finally, Levin (2003) has also shown that stationary contracts remain
optimal when types are independently drawn over time even under limited enforcement.
Our analysis below unveils to what extent stationarity should be taken with a word of
caution when types are persistent.
15We follow here Abreu (1988) and the literature on relational contracts (Levin 2003, Halac 2012) in
specifying that the worst equilibrium is played following a breach.
16Of course, the following identities hold: U∞(θ) ≡ U0(θ) and q∞(θ) ≡ q0(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ where U0(θ)
(resp. q0(θ)) is the seller’s intertemporal rent (resp. output) over the whole relationship.
17We adopt the convention that
∑−1
s=0 ys ≡ 0 for any sequence y.
18For instance, trading opportunities could follow a Poisson process with non-verifiable arrival dates.
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3. INCENTIVE-FEASIBLE AND ENFORCEABLE ALLOCATIONS
This section characterizes the set of incentive feasible allocations under costly enforce-
ment. This set is constrained by the usual agent’s incentive compatibility and participa-
tion constraints but also, and this is the novelty of our framework compared with more
standard mechanism design environments, by a new set of enforcement constraints.
Incentive-feasible and enforceable allocations. A seller with type θ accepts
the long-term contract when the following participation constraint holds:
(3.1) U0(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
We do not impose a priori a participation constraint from any date τ ≥ 1 on. Incentives to
renege and leave the relationship are precisely addressed by the enforceability constraints
that are more specific to our context.
Buyer’s enforceability. The buyer should pay in each period her due payment to
the seller. If she were to deviate and not to pay for delivery, she whould incur K and the
relationship would end (the private side). These enforcement constraints are described
below in compact form.
Definition 1 The mechanism C is buyer-enforceable if and only if:
(3.2) δV τ+1(θ) ≥ (1− δ)(t2,τ (θ)−K) ∀θ ∈ Θ ∀τ.
The l.h.s. represents the buyer’s discounted payoff from period τ + 1 onwards on the
equilibrium path. The r.h.s. is the buyer’s deviation payoff for the current period.
Seller’s enforceability∗. We first define the notion of enforceability (marked with
a superscript ∗ from now on) under complete information.
Definition 2 The mechanism C is seller-enforceable∗ if and only if:
(3.3) U0(θ) ≥ U τ (θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀τ.
The seller should never find optimal to breach the relationship at any date τ . The
benefits of continuing trades must exceed the short-term gains from pocketing a pre-
delivery payment at date τ and not delivering the good in the future. In other words,
(3.3) also amounts to:
(3.4) U τ (θ) ≥ (1− δ)(t1,τ (θ)− L).
Seller’s enforceability. Under asymmetric information, the seller’s enforcement
constraints are more complex because they interact with incentive compatibility require-
ments. Indeed, when the agent may deviate and not fulfill his obligations, the use of
the Revelation Principle must be taken with caution. The possibility for non-compliance
affects how incentive constraints should be written.
Definition 3 The mechanism C is seller-enforceable if and only if:
(3.5) U0(θ) ≥ max
θˆ∈Θ
U τ (θˆ) + (θˆ − θ)qτ (θˆ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀τ.
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The enforcement constraints (3.5) say that a type θ seller prefers to take the corre-
sponding contract rather than adopting a take-the-money-and-run strategy.19 This strat-
egy consists in mimicking a type θˆ for τ − 1 periods, delivering the corresponding output
at those dates, and then breaching at date τ , being only punished from date τ onwards.
Playing on the seller’s enforcement constraints highlights a few interesting cases. First,
taking τ =∞, the enforceability conditions (3.5) imply standard incentive compatibility:
(3.6) U0(θ) = max
θˆ∈Θ
U0(θˆ) + (θˆ − θ)q0(θˆ), ∀θ ∈ Θ.
In turn, a well-known consequence of incentive compatibility is that only monotonically
decreasing output schedules can be implemented:
(3.7) q0(θ) weakly decreasing.
Second, a breach of contract after some truthful behavior is still an option for the seller.
Preventing such behavior again yields constraints (3.4). However, note that the possibility
of immediately reneging on the contract before any trade gives also:
(3.8) U0(θ) ≥ (1− δ)
(
max
θˆ∈Θ
t1,0(θˆ)− L
)
.20
Enforceability. Let us conclude this section by stating the definition of an enforceable
mechanism, robust to bilateral opportunism.
Definition 4 The mechanism C is enforceable (resp. enforceable∗) if and only if it
is both buyer- and seller-enforceable (resp. seller-enforceable∗).
To get a compact formulation for the aggregate enforcement constraints under various
informational scenarios, we now define the enforcement surplus as:
(3.9) Ψ(θ,qτ (θ)) = (1− δ)
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S(qτ+s+1(θ)− θqτ+s+1(θ))− θqτ (θ) +M
)
.
The enforcement surplus represents the net gain for the trading partners when they choose
to enforce the contract from date τ on.
4. COMPLETE INFORMATION: STATIONARY CONTRACTS ARE OPTIMAL
In this section, we suppose that the cost parameter θ is common knowledge.
Characterization of enforceable∗ profiles. Next Lemma first explains the role
that the enforcement surplus plays in characterizing feasible allocations:
19Here, we borrow the vocabulary familiar from models with short-term contracting (see for instance,
Laffont and Tirole, 1993-Chapter 9, and Rey and Salanie´, 1993) although we consider a different sort of
limits on commitment.
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Lemma 1 A mechanism C is enforceable∗ if and only if implements a trade profiles
with a non-negative enforcement surplus at any date τ ≥ 0:
(4.1) Ψ(θ,qτ (θ)) ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ.
The feasibility condition (4.1) is easily obtained by summing the individual enforcement
constraints (3.2) and (3.3) under complete information. Under limited enforcement, feasi-
bility requires that the discounted value of future trades covers the sum of the individual
costs for breaching the contract. To understand the different terms in the l.h.s. of (4.1),
it is nevertheless useful to think of the case of a contract stipulating that the buyer should
appropriate all gains form trade in every period, i.e.,
tτ (θ) = θqτ (θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀τ.
Observe that such payments trivially satisfy (3.3). The aggregate enforcement constraint
(4.1) can now be written as:
(4.2) (1− δ)δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S(qτ+s+1(θ)− θqτ+s+1(θ)) ≥ (1− δ)(tτ (θ)−M) ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀τ.
The l.h.s. of (4.2) is thus the buyer’s future gains from trade provided he extracts the
seller’s surplus in all future periods. The r.h.s. is simply the net benefit of a deviation,
i.e., the benefit from not paying tτ (θ) to the seller minus the overall penalty for breach.
With such scheme, everything happens thus as if the buyer was de facto residual claimant
for all breaches.
Pooling the individual enforcement constraints to get (4.1) only provides a necessary
feasibility condition. Reciprocally, suppose that a profile of outputs satisfies (4.1) at all
dates τ ; then one can structure pre- and post-delivery prices so that both individual
enforcement constraints (3.2) and (3.3) hold. An easy way of doing so consists in taking
pre-delivery payments equal to the seller’s penalty for breach:
t1,τ (θ) = L ∀τ, ∀θ.
At the same time, the post-delivery price should extract the seller’s current surplus:
t2,τ (θ) = −L+ θqτ (θ) ∀τ, ∀θ.
For the rest of the analysis, we assume that L is small enough to ensure that this post-
delivery price remains positive under all circumstances, i.e.,
(4.3) L ≤ min
θ∈Θ
θq(θ).21
The payments (t1,τ (θ), t2,τ (θ)) then ensure that (3.5) trivially holds since:
U τ (θ) = (1− δ)(t1,τ (θ)− L) = 0 ∀τ.
Summarizing our earlier discussion, next proposition (whose proof is obvious) draws
some immediate but important implications from (4.1).
21 Had (4.3) not been satisfied, the seller could be asked to reimburse the buyer after delivery (i.e.,
t2,τ (θ) = −L + θqτ (θ) < 0 for some θ) so that the contract still fully extracts his surplus. This makes
not paying back an attractive possibility for the seller. When L is too small, this opportunistic behavior
could be simply controlled by imposing that post-delivery payments remain non-negative. We leave the
corresponding analysis of the optimal contract with this additional constraint for future research.
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Proposition 1 Everything happens as if the only threat was a breach of contract by
the buyer herself and the remedy that would apply for such breach is:
M = K + L.
The set of enforceable∗-allocations (and thus the optimal contract under complete infor-
mation) does not depend on the distribution of remedies for breach but only on M .
Anticipating our future findings, the same kind of invariance will apply under asymmet-
ric information as long as L is not too large. There also, an enforcement-surplus condition
will be obtained by pooling the buyer’s and the seller’s enforcement constraints. In doing
so, we shall nevertheless take care of the incentive compatibility constraints.
Enforceable∗ stationary contracts. Suppose a priori that the buyer offers a
stationary output profile. The aggregate enforcement constraints (4.1) are all identical
at all τ ≥ 0 and can be written as:
(4.4) ψ (θ, q(θ)) ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ.
The enforcement surplus becomes:
ψ (θ, q) = Ψ(θ, (q, q, ....)) = δS(q)− θq + (1− δ)M.
Observe that ψ is strictly concave in q and zero at some qe(θ). Since the buyer’s gross
surplus from trade is delayed to the next period in the definition of the enforcement
surplus, ψ achieves its maximum at an inefficient low output qdb(θ) < qfb(θ)22 (qdb(θ) is
defined through a first-order condition as δS ′(qdb(θ)) = θ). It also immediately follows
from ψ concavity in q that qe(θ) > qdb(θ).
The optimal contract. Under complete information, the buyer’s objective is to
maximize the discounted net surplus that she withdraws from trade, subject to the seller’s
individual rationality, and the aggregate enforcement constraint that altogether charac-
terize feasible trades. Formally, this problem can be stated as:
(P∗) : max
(q(θ),U0(θ))
(1−δ)
+∞∑
τ=0
δτ (S(qτ (θ))−θqτ (θ))−U0(θ) subject to (3.1) and (4.1).
The solution to this problem depends on whether enforcement constraints are binding
or not.
Theorem 1 Under complete information, the optimal contract is stationary but not
always efficient:
qsbτ (θ) =
{
qfb(θ) if ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) ≥ 0 ,
qe(θ) < qfb(θ) otherwise.
22The superscript is meant for delayed benefits.
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This Theorem deserves some comments. Some are directly related to the economic
intuition behind the existing distortions if any. Others are more technical but still deeply
connected to the economics of the problem.
Turning first to intuition, observe that when the aggregate enforcement constraint (4.1)
always holds, trade is efficient in every period and the seller’s surplus is fully extracted.
Of course, this outcome is stationary. This efficient scenario arises when it is easy to
prevent breaches. This can be because the cost of producing is small and the seller is
not tempted by not delivering. This might also be because the buyer’s benefit is large
and pursuing trade in the future is attractive. To illustrate, observe that, for a fixed the
level of public enforcement M , the inequality qe(θ) ≥ qfb(θ) always holds when δ is close
enough to 1. Enforcement is not an issue if parties value sufficiently the future even with
finite remedies. The private side of enforcement suffices.
The interesting case precisely arises for low discount factors and public remedies are
also needed. Then, efficient trades are no longer enforceable. Enforcement constraints are
binding at all dates. Yet, the fact that those constraints are not directly time-dependent
and similar from one period to the other is enough to ensure stationarity of the optimal
contract. However, production must be reduced below the first best so that payments are
also lowered and incentives for breaches less attractive on both sides of the transaction.
With inefficient trades, the stationarity of the optimal contract is much less obvious.
Indeed, relaxing the aggregate enforcement constraint (4.1) calls for reducing current
output so as the seller does not breach while at the same time increasing future trades
to also control the buyer. There is a priori no reason for those two forces to be always
of equal magnitude. For instance, the buyer could choose to a trade profile of with
outputs increasing over time simply by promising always even more surplus in future
rounds of trading. Avoiding such roll-balling strategy requires that the multiplier of the
enforcement constraint (4.1) at any date τ does not grow too fast. Indeed, much of the
technical works that is developed in the Appendix precisely consists in proving that such
exploding dynamics cannot arise.23
In a related context, Levin (2003) has showed that there is no loss of generality in
looking for an optimal contract as being stationary provided that an optimal contract
exists in the first place. This qualifier is an important one. The Lagragean techniques
that we use to prove Theorem 1 do not suffer from this weakness. We prove existence
altogether with properties of the optimal contract. Moreover, this approach turns out to
be applicable also under asymmetric information in contexts where stationarity might be
lost and no obvious class of contracts might appear attractive in the first place.
5. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: CHARACTERIZING ENFORCEABLE PROFILES
The seller’s enforceability conditions (3.5) have now more stringent implications beyond
the usual incentive compatibility constraints (3.6). Indeed, aggregating (3.2) and (3.5)
gives us a new set of feasibility conditions that are described in next Lemma.
Lemma 2 An incentive compatible mechanism C is enforceable if and only if the fol-
lowing aggregate enforcement constraints hold:
(5.1) Ψ(θ,qτ (θ)) ≥ δ−τ max
θˆ∈Θ
{
U0(θˆ)− U0(θ) + (θˆ − θ)qτ (θˆ)
}
, ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀τ ≥ 0.
23 From a technical perspective, it is interesting to observe that the constraints in (P∗) are forward
looking; a feature often found in the macroeconomic literature. See Marcet and Marimon (2011) for
references and Messner, Pavoni and Sleet (2013) for recent advances on that front.
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To understand how those feasibility conditions are constructed, let us first come back
on the seller’s enforcement constraints. In the very same spirit as under complete in-
formation, having pre-delivery payments equal to the seller’s remedy, i.e., t1,τ (θ) ≡ L,
ensures that the buyer becomes residual claimant for all breaches, at least as long as the
seller behaves truthfully. Yet, the seller may behave so only if constraints (3.5) hold.
In this respect, it should be intuitive that the most salient enforcement constraints
are those of a high-cost seller. Indeed, a low-cost seller, if he chooses to lie on his type
and produce a quantity qτ (θ) at a low marginal cost gets an information rent ∆θqτ (θ)
in period τ . This seller has no incentives for early breaches if he wants to pocket those
rents over the whole relationship.
Instead, a take-the-money-and-run strategy is particularly attractive for a high-cost
seller. That type may find it worth to behave as being more efficient and pocket the large
payment he receives for the first τ periods before breaching.
To illustrate, suppose that the payment for the high-cost seller fully extracts his surplus
in every period, i.e., tτ (θ) = θqτ (θ). That simple scheme satisfies (3.5) if and only if
U0(θ) ≥ max{U0(θ)−∆θqτ (θ)− δτ (U τ (θ)− (1− δ)(t1,τ (θ)− L)); 0}.
The first term on the r.h.s. is what can be grasped by a high-cost seller when behaving
as a low-cost one for τ − 1 periods. This strategy entails getting a high price but also
producing a large quantity in any of those earlier periods. The second term is simply the
zero surplus option that this high-cost seller secures from reporting truthfully.
Taking into account that t1,τ (θ) ≡ L, U0(θ) = ∆θq0(θ) ≥ U0(θ) = 0, we get:
(5.2) U τ (θ) ≥ δ−τ max{∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ (θ)); 0} ∀τ ≥ 0.
To prevent the high-cost seller’s take-the-money-and-run strategy, the buyer must push
the low-cost seller’s payments towards the future. Payments are back-loaded to facilitate
enforcement. Of course, this take-the-money-and-run strategy only matters earlier on
in the relationship. Had the high-cost seller misbehaved over the whole relationship, he
would just produce too much, a behavior that would violate incentive compatibility. The
beginning and the tail of the relationship do not look the same for the high-cost seller.
This important feature explains the non-stationarity of the optimal contract.
Pooling the buyer’s enforcement constraint (3.2) when trading with a low-cost seller
with the high-cost seller’s enforcement constraint (3.5) yields the following important
aggregate enforcement constraint:
(5.3) Ψ(θ,qτ (θ)) ≥ δ−τ max
{
∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ (θ)), 0
}
.24
Equipped with the constraint on forward rents (5.2), we may reinterpret (5.3) as saying
that the enforcement surplus must always cover the forward rent left to a low-cost seller.
There are two specific cases that deserve more attention. First, observe that, since the
enforcement constraints hold at all τ , we may as well take their limits as τ goes to infinity.
24It is immediate to see that, whenever (5.3) is binding, the enforcement constraints (3.2) and (3.5)
for the inefficient seller are both also binding.
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Doing so shows that those conditions look the same as under complete information in
the limit if the monotonic conditions (3.7) is strict because the max on the right-hand
side is then zero. In other words, in the long run the consequences for contract design of
asymmetric information and limited enforcement can be somewhat disentangled. Limited
enforcement might thus only impact for at most a finite number of early periods.
Second, turning now to the case τ = 0, constraint (5.3) becomes:
(5.4) Ψ(θ,q0(θ)) ≥ ∆θq0(θ).
This condition is similar to (4.2) with the only difference being now that the first-period
payment made to the low-cost seller has also to pay for the extra information rent that
this type can get, namely ∆θq0(θ). Asymmetric information hardens the aggregate en-
forceability constraint at date τ = 0.
6. THE OPTIMALITY OF NON-STATIONARY CONTRACTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
We now suppose that qfb(θ) ≤ qe(θ) for all θ. This assumption ensures that, under
complete information, the enforcement surplus is always non-negative. From Theorem 1,
trade is thus always efficient in that case. Focusing on such scenario isolates the most
interesting contracting patterns that may now arise under asymmetric information.
The optimal contract. The buyer’s objective is now to maximize the discounted
net surplus that she withdraws from trade, subject to the seller’s individual rationality,
incentive compatibility and the new aggregate enforcement constraints. Formally, we get:
(P) : max
(q(θ),U0(θ))
Eθ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
τ=0
δτ (S(qτ (θ))− θqτ (θ))− U0(θ)
)
subject to (3.1), (3.6), and (5.1).
6.1. Implementing the Baron-Myerson Outcome
We first present conditions under which enforceability is not an issue. As a by-product,
the optimal contract then turns out to be stationary.
Theorem 2 Suppose that
(6.1) ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) ≥ ∆θqbm(θ) and ψ(θ, qbm(θ)) ≥ 0.
An optimal contract is stationary and corresponds to the infinite replica of the Baron-
Myerson outcome.
When there are enough gains from trade with a low-cost seller to prevent breaches by
both parties, the Baron-Myerson allocation is enforceable at no extra cost. This is so even
if the price received by this low-cost seller is greater than under complete information as
a result of an extra information rent.
To give more intuition, observe that (6.1) implies that (5.3) holds at date 0 when
t0(θ) = t0(θ), i.e., if all (per period) payments to the efficient agent are paid upfront. The
most attractive deviation for the buyer would then be not to pay that amount at date 0
and breach the contract right away but (6.1) ensures that such deviation is not valuable.
In the scenario depicted by Theorem 2, restricting the analysis to stationary contracts
has no bite and the Baron-Myerson allocation is optimal within the broadest possible
class of incentive mechanisms that can be envisioned.
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6.2. Optimal Stationary Contracts
When (6.1) does not hold, the stationary Baron-Myerson outcome can no longer be
implemented. Let us now a contrario assume that the information rent left to a low-cost
seller in that Baron-Myerson scenario is too large to allow enforcement:
(6.2) 0 ≤ ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) < ∆θqbm(θ) and ψ(θ, qbm(θ)) ≥ 0.
A first possibility of interest to satisfy the enforcement constraints is to choose a sta-
tionary contract. In that case, (5.3) amounts to:
ψ(θ, q(θ)) ≥ δ−τ max{∆θ(q(θ)− q(θ)) + ∆θq(θ)), 0} ∀τ ≥ 0.
For any output profile satisfying (3.7) this enforcement constraint holds at τ ≥ 1 if it
already holds at τ = 0. Intuitively, with a stationary contract, if any breach happens, it
is not delayed and takes place right away. This leads to the simpler requirement:
(6.3) ψ(θ, q(θ)) ≥ ∆θq(θ).
Equipped with this feasibility condition, we can now obtain the following characterization.
Proposition 2 When condition (6.2) holds, the optimal stationary contract entails:
1. Downward output distortions below the Baron-Myerson outcome
(6.4) S ′(qst(θ)) = θ +
(1− δ)Λ
ν + Λδ
∆θ
(6.5) S ′(qst(θ)) = θ +
ν + Λ
1− ν ∆θ
where Λ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the binding enforcement constraint (6.3);
2. Only the low-cost seller receives a positive information rent:
U
st
0 (θ) = ∆θq
st(θ) > 0 = U
st
0 (θ).
The Lagrange multiplier Λ provides an indirect measure of the quality of the judicial
system, i.e., the fact that the aggregate remedies M is not enough to ensure enforceability.
Because that multiplier impacts on screening distortions, the quality of the judicial system
and contract performances are now linked altogether.
With stationary contracts, an imperfect enforcement impacts on the seller’s output for
any realization of his cost. Both outputs are reduced as enforcement problems become
more acute. This result will change when non-stationary contracts are considered below.
The explanation behind those output distortions is simple. To relax the binding en-
forceability constraint (6.3), the buyer would like to reduce the price paid to a low-cost
seller so as to make breaches less attractive. To do so, two instruments are used in tan-
dem. First, the buyer may commit to buy even less from a high-cost seller than in the
Baron-Myerson scenario. This distortion reduces the information rent of the low-cost
seller. Second, the buyer can also ask for less output from a low-cost seller.
With stationary contracts, reducing the low-cost seller’s output has nevertheless two
conflicting effects. First, it reduces the benefits of a current breach which definitively
relaxes the enforceability constraint (6.3). Second, it reduces also the surplus in future
trading rounds which is, on the contrary, detrimental for enforceability. Those two con-
flicting roles can be disentangled with non-stationary contracts as we will see below.
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6.3. Non-Stationary Optimal Contract
To prepare for a characterization of the dynamics of optimal contracts, we need to
introduce some notations and some technical conditions. In this respect, we first suppose
that the following inequality holds:
(6.6) 0 ≤ ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) < ∆θqbm(θ) ≤ ψ(θ, qbm(θ)).25
This assumption strengthens condition (6.2). It ensures that only the enforcement con-
straint (5.3) related to the enforcement surplus with a low-cost type might be binding at
the optimum.26
Condition (6.6) implies that qbm(θ) < qe(θ) and qe(θ) < qfb(θ). Let us thus start from
any arbitrary point q0(θ) ∈
[
qe(θ), qfb(θ)
]
to construct recursively the sequence q(θ) as:
(6.7)
{
q0(θ) ∈
[
qe(θ), qfb(θ)
]
qτ+1(θ) = Φ(qτ (θ))
where the function Φ(q) = S−1
(
1
δ
(
θq − (1− δ)M)) is defined over the interval [ (1−δ)M
θ
,+∞
)
.
Observe that Φ is increasing and convex. Because Φ
(
(1−δ)M
θ
)
= 0 and Φ(qbm(θ)) > qbm(θ)
when qbm(θ) < qe(θ), there exists a unique fixed point to Φ within the open interval(
0, qbm(θ)
)
. This fixed point is qe(θ). For future references, we also note that the inverse
function Γ(q) = Φ−1(q) = 1
θ
(δS(q) + (1− δ)M) is increasing and concave.
Theorem 3 below shows that the dynamic pattern of trading with a low-cost seller
entails two distinct phases. In the first early periods, his output continuously increases
while remaining inefficiently low. The fact that output is distorted with both types
over this transitory phase bears some similarity with the contracting pattern obtained
when the analysis is a priori restricted to stationary contracts. In the mature phase
of contracting that follows, trade with a low-cost seller becomes efficient and the sole
distortion concerns the high-cost seller’s output. Yet this distortion remains constant
over time. The optimal contract in the long run exhibits features that come close to
those found under the standard Baron-Myerson scenario modulo a modification of the
virtual cost that now reflects the magnitude of the enforcement problem.
Theorem 3 Suppose that condition (6.6) holds. There almost always27 exists τ ∗ ≥ 1
such that the optimal contract passes through two different phases.
1. Early phase of contracting with growing output. For τ ≤ τ ∗, the
optimal output qsbτ (θ) of the low-cost seller strictly increases over time but remains
inefficient:
(6.8) qe(θ) < qsbτ (θ) ≤ qfb(θ).
26This condition is more likely to be satisfied when qbm(θ) is itself small, which arises for example
when the probability of having a high-cost seller is low enough.
27The qualifier “almost always” in the statement of Theorem 3 comes from the fact that the buyer
may sometimes be indifferent between keeping the enforcement constraint binding till date τ∗ − 1 and
till date τ∗.
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The enforcement constraint (5.3) is binding at all dates τ ≤ τ ∗ and the sequence
qsbτ (θ) obeys the recursive condition (6.7).
2. Mature phase of contracting with stationary output. For τ > τ ∗, the
optimal output qsbτ (θ) of a low-cost seller is equal to its first-best level:
(6.9) qsbτ (θ) = q
fb(θ).
The enforcement constraint (5.3) is slack at all those dates.
3. At all dates τ , the high-cost seller produces the same quantity qsb(θ) which remains
below the Baron-Myerson level:
(6.10) S ′(qsb(θ)) = θ +
ν + Λ∞
1− ν ∆θ
for some Λ∞ > 0.
4. Only the low-cost seller receives a positive information rent:
U
sb
0 (θ) = ∆θq
sb(θ) > 0 = U
sb
0 (θ).
The buyer is somewhat torn between two objectives: first, making contracts easier
to enforce and second implementing an allocation close to the Baron-Myerson outcome
which would maximize gains from trade if enforcement was costless.
There are two ways to relax enforceability constraints. The first one consists in increas-
ing future surpluses. This is obtained by increasing the low-cost seller’s output towards
its first-best level.
With non-stationary contracts, the buyer can also backload the payments needed to
induce information revelation from a low-cost seller while, at the same time, ensuring that
the take-the-money-and-run strategy of high-cost seller is not a threat. Pushing payments
towards the future again relaxes enforceability constraints till output distortions with a
low-cost seller are no longer needed. In this mature phase of contracting, the contract
becomes stationary. However, and in contrast, with what arises when restricting a priori
to stationary contracts, a low-cost seller now produces efficiently. Our model thus predicts
an increasing dispersion of outputs as time passes contrary to what arises with stationary
contracts.28
The parameter Λ∞, is now a cumulative of all Lagrange multipliers for all the enforce-
ment constraints that arise over time. It keeps track of all distortions due to enforcement
over the whole contract duration. Yet, this parameter again links altogether the nature
of the screening distortions and the quality of the legal system. Lower remedies means
that payments and outputs should be reduced to facilitate enforcement. A greater value
of Λ∞ comes thus with more output distortions. Therefore, we expect greater output
distortions and back-loaded payments when enforcement is more difficult.
28The fact that the optimal contract is not stationary implies that, at the beginning of the relationship,
the buyer would like to commit to a trades pattern which is no longer optimal as times passes. Yet, in
this model with persistent types, leaving the possibility of renegotiating the continuation of the contract
and re-optimizing trading profiles from a given date on would modify the seller’s incentives to reveal his
type earlier on, introducing all well-known difficulties from the renegotiation literature.
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Implementation. The fact that the aggregate enforcement constraint at a given date
binds puts quite a bit of structure on the intertemporal profile of payments. This stands
in sharp contrast with the case of costless enforcement (Baron and Besanko, 1984) since
then only the values of the overall intertemporal payments to both types are known from
the binding incentive and participation constraints.29 Next Proposition exhibits a profile
of payments that implements the optimal allocation described in Theorem 3.
Proposition 3 Suppose that condition (6.6) holds.
1. Pre-delivery payments always cover the seller’s penalty for breach:
(6.11) tsb1,τ (θ) = L ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀τ ≥ 0.
2. the high-cost seller’s payment can be taken to be stationary:
(6.12) tsbτ (θ) = θq
sb(θ) ∀τ ≥ 0.
3. the low-cost seller’s payment is increasing over the early phase of contracting
(6.13) tsbτ (θ) = θq
sb
τ (θ) ∀τ ≤ τ ∗ − 1
and can be taken to be stationary over the mature phase
(6.14) tsbτ (θ) = θq
fb(θ) + δ−τ
∗
∆θ(qsb(θ)− qsb
τ∗
(θ)) ∀τ > τ ∗.
The pre-delivery payments in (6.11) just make the buyer residual claimant for all penal-
ties for breach. The overall payments (6.12) fully extract the high-cost seller’s rent in each
period. Finally, Theorem 3 has shown that the enforcement constraints (5.3) are binding
at all dates τ ≤ τ ∗. An immediate corollary is that the inefficient seller’s enforcement
constraints (3.5) are then also binding. The high-cost seller’s take-the-money-and-run
strategy is thus prevented by keeping this type just indifferent between pretending being
more efficient and getting no profit in each period.30
The final step in constructing payments consists in ensuring that the stationary payment
in (6.14) offered over the mature phase together with the prices over the growing phase
described (6.13) just ensure that the low-cost seller receives enough rent to truthfully
reveal his type at date 0.
Finally, the specification of those payments allows us to find an upper bound on L so
that the post-delivery payment t2τ (θ) remains non-negative as posited, namely:
L ≤ min{θqsb(θ), θqsbτ (θ), θqfb(θ) + δ−τ
∗
∆θ(qsb(θ)− qsb
τ∗
(θ))}.
Length of the growing phase. The length of the first phase trades off two competing
effects. First, increasing the number of periods where the enforcement constraints (5.3)
are binding smoothes the cost of the take-the-money-and-run strategy. However doing so
might unnecessarily delay efficient trade with a low-cost seller. We now provide a simple
upper bound, computed from fundamentals only, on the length of this earlier phase.
29Those payments can be chosen to be stationary as shown above but there is much leeway beyond.
30This feature is reminiscent of the countervailing incentives literature (Lewis and Sappington, 1989).
In our context, countervailing incentives apply to different kinds of constraints (incentive and enforcement
constraints) and full separation remains possible.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that condition (6.6) holds. An upper bound on the number of
periods in the growing phase of contracting is:
(6.15) int
− ln
(
ψ(θ,qfb(θ))
∆θ(qbm(θ)−qe(θ))
)
ln(δ)
+ 1.
When δ goes to 0, only the public side of enforcement matters; future surplus is of no
help to prevent opportunism. The enforcement constraint (5.3) at date 0 then almost
boils down to a simple constraint on output and forward rent at this date, namely
(6.16) M − θq0(θ) ≥ U0(θ).
In that limiting case, the numerator of (6.15) remains bounded while the denominator
goes to infinity so that the upper bound is equal to one. Since condition (6.6) also implies
that the enforcement constraint is necessarily binding, there is precisely a single period,
date τ = 0, where the enforcement constraint (5.3) is binding when δ is small enough.
From this, we immediately get the distortion on the high-cost seller’s output for such low
discount rates as:
ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) ≈δ≈0 M − θqfb(θ) = ∆θqsbδ≈0(θ) < ∆θqbm(θ).
Intuitively, when the future no longer matters, the buyer finds it costless to postpone
payments to the low-cost seller so as trade is efficient at all future dates. All output
distortions with a low-cost seller then appear in the first period of the relationship.31
Substitutability between public and private enforcements. Getting general
comparative statics on the length of the growing phase described in Theorem 3 is not
easy. To nevertheless get simple insights on how the length of this phase varies, we now
ask which variations of fundamentals keep it constant.
To simplify, consider the case where the parameters M and δ are such that there is only
one round in the growing phase (i.e., the enforcement constraint (5.3) is only binding at
date 0). Starting from such constellation of parameters, suppose that the continuation
of the relationship matters marginally more for the partners (i.e., δ increases). Certainly,
a first impact of relying more on the private side of enforcement is to increase the en-
forcement surplus with an efficient seller ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) = δS(qfb(θ)) − θqfb(θ) + (1 − δ)M
(provided that S(qfb(θ)) > M). This of course relaxes the binding enforcement constraint
at date 0 and calls for lower distortions in the low-cost seller’s production. On the other
hand, increasing δ makes it also more attractive to adopt a take-the-money-and-run strat-
egy and breach contract at date 1 for the high-cost seller. This hardens the enforcement
constraint (5.3) at date 1.
Next proposition elaborates on a joint change of M and δ that offers unambiguous
conclusions on the length of the growing phase.
Proposition 5 Suppose that condition (6.6) holds and that the earlier stage with grow-
ing output lasts only one period (i.e., q0(θ) < qτ (θ) = q
fb(θ) for all τ ≥ 1). Increasing δ
31When instead δ goes to 1 so as the future matters a lot in the relationship and the private side
of enforcement more significant, the upper bound in (6.15) gives us much less information. As already
noticed, this is precisely under such scenario that enforcement is no longer an issue.
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while keeping ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) fixed maintains the length of the growing phase of contracting
at only one round.
To keep ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) fixed, an increase in δ must be compensated by a simultaneous de-
crease in M , i.e., by reducing the importance public enforcement. Proposition 5 highlights
some form of substitutability between the two kinds of enforcement.
7. ROBUSTNESS
This section discusses various extensions of our basic framework.
7.1. More General Results
The strength of condition (6.6) was to ensure that only the enforcement constraint in
state θ matters for contract dynamics. Yet, even when the weaker condition (6.2) only
holds and the enforcement constraint might bind also in state θ, much can still be said on
trading patterns, at least in their long run limits. Indeed, Theorem 4 below demonstrates
that efficiency and extra distortions beyond the Baron-Myerson level remain important
features of contract dynamics.
Theorem 4 Suppose that condition (6.2) holds. The optimal contract has always the
following properties in the long run.
1. Trade with a low-cost seller is always efficient:
(7.1) lim
τ→+∞
S ′(qτ (θ)) = θ.
2. Trade with a high-cost seller is lower than in the Baron-Myerson outcome:
(7.2) lim
τ→+∞
qτ (θ) = q
sb(θ) < qbm(θ)
7.2. Continuum of Types
In our analysis so far, types were discrete while the optimal output could take values in
a continuum. This flexibility allowed us to fully describe the pattern of increasing trades
over the growing phase of contracting with much details. In this section, we entertain
the possibility that types are continuous and investigate the robustness of our previous
findings. To simplify the analysis and avoid unnecessary technicalities, let us assume that
θ is uniformly distributed on Θ =
[
θ, θ
]
.
For future references, let us also define an output profile qΨ(θ) and a cut-off θΨ such
that
(7.3)
{
S ′(qΨ(θ)) = 2θ − θ + Ψ if θ ≤ θΨ
qΨ(θ) = 0 otherwise
where θΨ solves S ′(0) = 2θΨ − θ + Ψ if such solution exists in Θ and θΨ = θ otherwise.
The optimal static contract is characterized by the usual Baron-Myerson distortion
qbm(θ) ≡ q0(θ) and a positive rent for the seller (at least for those types θ ≤ θbm ≡ θ0)
given by U bm(θ) =
∫ θbm
θ
qbm(x)dx = tbm(θ) − θqbm(θ). Inefficient types θ ≥ θbm do not
produce and get thus no rent. Again, in this framework, the buyer’s marginal surplus
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must equal the seller’s virtual cost which exceeds true cost under asymmetric information
since indeed 2θ − θ ≥ θ. The corresponding downward output distortion helps reducing
the costly information rent left to the seller.
Characterizing Enforceable Allocations. Working with a continuum of types
allows us to get an elegant characterization of aggregate enforcement constraints.
Lemma 3 An incentive compatible mechanism C is enforceable if and only if
(7.4) Ψ(θ,qτ (θ)) ≥ δ−τ max
θˆ∈Θ
{∫ θˆ
θ
q0(x)dx+ (θ − θˆ)qτ (θ)
}
, ∀θ ∈ Θ, τ ≥ 0.
Clearly, the r.h.s. above is always strictly positive, at least at any θ < θ. The enforce-
ment constraints are thus always harder to satisfy under asymmetric information.
Implementability of the Baron-Myerson allocation. Mimicking our analysis
of the discrete case, we first highlight conditions under which enforceability is not an issue.
The restriction to stationary contracts has again no bite in such contexts and the Baron-
Myerson allocation is thus optimal within the broadest possible class of mechanisms.
Theorem 5 Suppose that
(7.5) ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) ≥
∫ θ
θ
qbm(x)dx and qbm(θ) ≥ qdb(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.32
The optimal contract is stationary and implements in each period the Baron-Myerson
allocation (U bm(θ), qbm(θ)).
The conditions (7.5) ensure that, if there is enough enforcement surplus with the most
efficient type to cover his information rent then, enforcement constraints are automatically
satisfied for less efficient types. Even though the enforcement surplus is lower with those
types, it decreases less quickly than the corresponding information rent.
Optimal Stationary Contract. Lemma 3 admits a simpler expression when the
analysis is restricted to stationary contracts.
Lemma 4 A stationary and incentive compatible mechanism C is enforceable if and only
if the following aggregate enforcement constraints hold:
(7.6) ψ(θ, q(θ)) ≥ U(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
q(x)dx ∀θ ∈ Θ.
From now on, we shall thus assume that the Baron-Myerson allocation is not always
enforceable. Under that scenario, distortions arise to relax the enforcement constraints.
32Observe that qdb(θ) is small enough when δ is also small so that the second part of (7.5) trivially
holds in that case.
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Proposition 6 Suppose that
(7.7) ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) <
∫ θ
θ
qbm(x)dx.
The optimal stationary contract entails a non-increasing and continuous output sched-
ule qst(θ) with a non-trivial interval of bunching on
[
θ, θˆ
]
(with θˆ > θ) over which the
enforcement constraint (7.6) is binding:
(7.8) qst(θ) =
{
qΨ(θˆ) if θ ≤ θˆ,
qΨ(θ) if θ ≥ θˆ
for some Ψ > 0 provided that qΨ(θˆ) ≥ qdb(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.33
To understand the downward distortion, observe that the enforcement constraint (7.6)
is relaxed by moving the output closer downward to the value qdb(θ) that maximizes the
enforcement surplus and thus the l.h.s. of this constraint. At the same time, such down-
ward reduction of output reduces the seller’s information rent, decreases his payments
and eases enforcement as well; a second effect that impacts on the r.h.s. of (7.6) .
Those two effects are familiar from our analysis of the discrete case. However, with a
continuum of types, a new phenomenon arises: bunching on the lower tail of the types
distribution. To understand its nature, it is easier to think of the case where δ is small
enough. Then, the enforcement constraint (7.6) with a stationary contract amounts to a
simple condition on payments:
(7.9) M ≥ t(θ) = U(θ) + θq(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Incentive compatibility ensures that payments are increasing so that, whenever (7.9)
starts being binding it is also so for all most efficient types.34,35 The only possibility is
then to offer a constant price and output for those most efficient types. By incentive
33Take M small enough so that the Baron-Myerson allocation is just implementable, i.e.,
ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) =
∫ θ
θ
qbm(x)dx and qbm(θ) ≥ qdb(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Starting from this benchmark and slightly reducing M , the enforcement constraint (7.6) is only binding
on a small interval around θ and Ψ is small enough. Then the condition qΨ(θˆ) ≥ qdb(θ) also holds.
34 Thomas (2002) and Gautier and Mitra (2006) have also studied screening problems with exogenous
bounds on payments. The constraint in payments coming here from imperfect enforcement constraint
is by construction endogenous. The optimal contract with an exogenous constraint nevertheless shares
some features with the optimal contract here; namely bunching at the top and a modified Baron-Myerson
downward distortion of production for least efficient types. Levin (2003) also stresses the existence of
bunching on the lower tail of the cost distributions for the optimal relational contract. Although, an
optimal stationary contract in our framework also exhibits this feature, technical details differ. First,
when focusing on i.i.d. types as in Levin (2003), the future surplus that facilitates enforcement is
independent on current types so that distortions on current outputs have no impact on future surplus.
Second, there is no asymmetric information at the inception of the relationship and rent extraction is
not an issue in Levin (2003)’s framework.
35The non-responsiveness of the contract (Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984) on the lower tail of the cost
distribution can be interpreted as an endogenous contract incompleteness. Not all contingencies can be
contracted upon as a result of the enforcement problem.
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compatibility, compressing payments for those most efficient types also requires further
downward output distortions for least efficient ones. The output requested from those
types is everywhere distorted downwards below the Baron-Myerson solution.
Non-Stationary Contracts Are Again Optimal. Finding the optimal mechanism
with a continuum of non-stationary enforcement constraints (7.4) that apply at all dates
is a daunting task. Yet, the characterization of the optimal stationary contract is simple
enough so that we can easily exhibit a valuable non-stationary deviation.
Consider indeed a contract that differs from the optimal stationary contract character-
ized in Proposition 6 only at date 0 where the output is:
(7.10) q0(θ) = q
st(θ)− ε
for some ε ≥ 0 small enough.
With stationarity, the output qst(θ) plays two competing roles as we already stressed.
On the one hand, increasing this output towards the first best increases future gains from
trade which eases enforcement. On the other hand, decreasing this output also reduces the
seller’s current rent and payment which also facilitates enforcement. The non-stationary
deviation (7.10) allows at the same time to reduce date 0-output, decreases date 0-
payment and facilitates enforcement at that date without jeopardizing future surplus.
Theorem 6 Assume that qst(θ) is everywhere non-negative, the optimal contract is
non-stationary.36
7.3. One-Sided Breach
That opportunism is bilateral was a key ingredient allowing us to pool enforcement
constraints on each side of the relationship into a single condition. When opportunism
is only on one side, pre- and post-delivery payments can be found which implement the
Baron-Myerson at no extra cost.
To illustrate this point, we first consider the case where only the buyer may behave
opportunistically. In each period, pre- and post-trade payments can be constructed so as
to induce the buyer to behave. More precisely, define
t2,τ (θ) = K+
δ
1− δ (S(q
bm(θ)−tbm(θ)) and t1,τ (θ)+t2,τ (θ) = tbm(θ), ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Post-delivery payments are such that the buyer is indifferent at each period between
breaching, paying the corresponding remedies and losing his future gains from trade at
the Baron-Myerson allocation. In other words, the mechanism so constructed is buyer-
enforceable and constraints (3.2) hold at any date. Pre-delivery payments are such that
the seller receives the corresponding Baron-Myerson payments.
Suppose now that only the seller might behave opportunistically. Suppose also, to
harden the case, that he is privately informed. We want to construct a mechanism that
implements the Baron-Myerson allocation and is seller-enforceable. To do so, it must
36Building on this insight might suggest a recursive construction of the optimal non-stationary contract
in the case of a continuum of types. The new contract so constructed could be pushed forwards from
date 1 on and we could look for a date 0-optimal contract with this contract as a continuation. And, we
could iterate the process. The characterization of such optimal non-stationary contracts is very complex
and left for future research.
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be that (3.5) always holds at any date and for any type. By an argument which is by
now familiar, the low-cost seller’s enforcement constraint is not an issue if the stationary
payment extracts the high-cost seller’s surplus in each period, namely:
tτ (θ) = t
bm(θ) = θqbm(θ), ∀τ ≥ 0.
Enforcement constraints with a high-cost seller are thus satisfied with the following pre-
and post-delivery payments:
tτ (θ) = L, and t2,τ (θ) = θq
bm(θ)− L ∀τ ≥ 0.
Observe that post-delivery payments are here also non-negative if L is not too large.
More interesting maybe are transfers that prevent the take-the-money-and-run strategy
of a high-cost seller. From (3.5), backward payoffs U τ (θ) must then satisfy:
U0(θ) = 0 ≥ U τ (θ)− (1− δτ )∆θqfb(θ), ∀τ ≥ 0.
Finding such payoffs is now easy. Define τ ∗ as the highest integer such that (1 −
δτ )∆θqfb(θ) < ∆θqbm(θ). Such integer exists and is unique because qfb(θ) ≥ qbm(θ).
Over the first τ ∗ periods, we now take pre-delivery payments that make the high-cost
seller just indifferent between breaching or not in each period:
U τ (θ) = (1− δτ )∆θqbm(θ) + δτ (1− δ)(t1,τ (θ)−L) = (1− δτ )∆θqfb(θ), ∀τ < τ ∗.
After those τ ∗ periods, we then choose pre-delivery payments to implement a constant
backward rent equal to the low-cost seller’s Baron-Myerson information rent:
U τ (θ) = (1− δτ )∆θqbm(θ) + δτ (1− δ)(t1,τ (θ)− L) = ∆θqbm(θ), ∀τ ≥ τ ∗.
Post-delivery payments are then adjusted to again implement Baron-Myerson payments:
t1,τ (θ) + t2,τ (θ) = t
bm(θ) = θqbm(θ) + ∆θqbm(θ).
Observe again that post-delivery payments are non-negative when L is again small enough.
We can thus conclude:
Theorem 7 One-sided opportunism is costless. 37
8. APPLICATIONS
The framework developed in this paper is useful to address or revisit a number of
important questions in organization theory.
Asset specificity and contract enforcement. The contractual setting entertained in this
paper can be viewed as a stylized modeling of an ongoing relationship between a contrac-
tor and his long-term supplier for an essential input. The Transaction Costs Economics
literature has already discussed at length how opportunism and asset specificity shape
such relationships, especially in terms of their impacts on the optimal degree of vertical
37Of course, whenever pre- or post-delivery payments are bounded or even absent, it may be impossible
to achieve such simple result. We leave it to future research to investigate possible distortions in such
environments.
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integration and more generally on contract duration.38 Yet, we are not aware of any
empirical work that would have investigated how trading volumes evolve over time when
parties are stuck in long-term bilateral contracts because of their earlier specific invest-
ments. Similarly, how differences in legal environments may impact on contract duration
remains, to the best of our knowledge, an unexplored issue.
To shed some light on contract duration through the lens of our model, observe that
the optimal contractual dynamics found above can also be viewed as a metaphor for how
transactions go from spot contracts at their inception towards more mature relationships.
Over the growing phase where enforcements constraints are binding, the relationship must
build safeguards against bilateral opportunism while in the long run, mature relationships
which no longer subject to its threat.
Even though specific investments are not present in our baseline model, our framework
can be readily extended to link asset specificity and enforcement issues. To do so, sup-
pose that, prior to contracting, the buyer makes a relation-specific investment ib. This
investment enhances the trading surplus in each period τ by an amount Bb(ib) (with
B′b > 0 and B
′′
b < 0 ):
S(qτ )− θqτ +Bb(ib).
Either under complete information, or even under asymmetric information but in the
absence of any enforcement problem, the efficient level of investment ifbb thus satisfies:
B′b(i
fb
b ) = 1.
39
Let now denote also by Cb(ib) the buyer’s opportunity costs for the foregone use of
dedicated assets if the contract is breached (with C ′b > 0 and C
′′
b < 0). That private costs
also increases with asset specificity. Everything happens as if this extra cost was now
counted as an implicit penalty for breach. Typically, the enforcement constraint at date
τ now is:
Ψ(θ,qτ (θ)) + δBb(ib) + (1− δ)Cb(ib) ≥ δ−τ max
{
∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ (θ)), 0
}
.
The optimal investment level ieb must now take into account its impact on contracts
enforceability. There is of course a first direct effect in relaxing enforcement constraints
and second, an indirect effect, that comes from changing optimal trade profiles as a result.
By the Envelope Theorem, this indirect effect vanishes and ieb solves:
(1 + Λ∞δ)B′b(i
e
b) + Λ∞(1− δ)C ′b(ieb) = 1.
The buyer is now eager to increase her investment as a commitment device to facilitate
enforcement. Moreover, those incentives more pronounced as the cumulative Lagrange
multiplier Λ∞ is bigger, i.e., when enforcement is more difficult. Since we also know that
output distortions are more pronounced in that case, the model predicts that specific
investments and outputs may covary negatively. The model predicts also more investment
in environments with more pronounced enforcement problems.
Consider now the case where the seller invests an amount is. Using obvious notations
for the benefit and opportunity costs of such investment, the (interior) efficient level of
investment ifbs would now solve:
B′s(i
fb
s ) = 1.
38See Joskow (1987, 1988) and Crocker and Masten (1988, 1996) among many others.
39Assuming, for simplicity, an interior solution.
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The enforcement constraint at date τ now writes as:
Ψ(θ,qτ (θ)) +Bs(is) + (1− δ)Cs(is) ≥ δ−τ max
{
∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ (θ)), 0
}
.
Under asymmetric information, the seller chooses an investment level ies that maximizes
his overall expected rent taking into account that the trade profile is modified by the
buyer as enforcement becomes easier. Formally, an interior solution ieb would solve:
∆θ
∂qsb
∂Λ∞
(θ,Λ∞)
∂Λ∞
∂is
= 1
where we make explicit the dependence of outputs on the Lagrange multiplier Λ∞ but
also the dependence of Λ∞ itself on is. Observe that the optimal investment would be at
a corner, i.e., ies = 0, if there was no enforcement problem. The seller’s expected rent is
then at its Baron-Myerson level ∆θqbm(θ) which indeed does not depend of the investment
level. Instead, increasing the seller’s investment becomes valuable when enforcement
constraints are binding. Choosing ies > 0 relaxes the enforcement constraint, reduces
the multiplier Λ∞ which also boosts the (constant) output qsb(θ) given by (6.10). We
can finally conclude that, whether specific investment is from the buyer or the seller, it
increases to relax the enforcement problem.
Relational contracting and firm’s boundaries. Gibbons (2005a) argues that one of the key
research questions in the Property Rights literature is to understand how relational con-
tracts are affected by firm’s boundaries. Our paper contributes to this important debate.
Suppose that the informed seller may perform some specific investment is prior to con-
tracting. That investment now improves the value of trade by increasing the probability
ν(is) of being efficient. Following Riordan (1990), we may assume that ownership gives
access to information. Consider thus a vertically integrated firm owned by the buyer.
The seller has thus no information rent and no incentives to make any ex ante invest-
ment; is = 0. The seller becomes an employee of the firm and, at any point in time, this
employee has the right to leave the firm.40
Under vertical separation, the seller owns the assets, retains private information and
thus some expected informational rent worth ν(is)q
sb(θ¯). This expected rent acts as
an engine for investment. Of course, this rent also hardens the enforcement problem.
Our model first predicts that take-the-money-and-run strategy will only arise in mar-
ket relationships between vertically separate units. Second, market relationships come
with greater volumes over time whereas within firms exchanges may exhibit more stable
patterns through stationarity. Finally, output distortions being greater when enforce-
ment problems are more acute, vertical integration becomes thus more attractive in weak
enforcement contexts.
Another related interpretation of our findings is that reducing the cost of enforcing
contracts requires the ability to back-load payments. Such back-loading might be more
easily achieved for transactions in thin markets than when firms can more easily found
alternative partners. This case indeed amounts to an implicit reduction of the discount
rate and thus makes private enforcement of contracts more difficult. In that sense also,
our model predicts more vertical integration and long-term contracts in environments
where enforcement is a key concern.
40Presumably, L = 0 in the case of non-alienable employment relationships.
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9. LITERATURE REVIEW
We end this paper by situating our findings with respect to the existing literature.
Indeed, our paper merges issues found in various trends of the contracting literature.
Relational contracting. Basics. That a continuing relationship improves contracting
even when contractual possibilities are limited is the basic tenet of an important litera-
ture on relational contracting (Bull 1987, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989 and 1998, Baker
and al. 1994, among others).41 There, the seller’s effort (or output) is non-verifiable but
remains observable. Short-term bonuses suffice to provide enough incentives provided
the relationship is sufficiently repeated. This framework has been extended to study how
relational contracts are modified when some extra variables relevant for trade might re-
main contractible.42 In our context, prices and traded quantities are always contractible
and parties can commit to a long-term contract. The only non-verifiable variables at
any point in time in the game are the parties’ decisions on whether to fulfill contractual
obligations or not.43 The contracting environment we consider is thus somewhere in be-
tween relational contracting and the full commitment/full enforcement scenario analyzed
when complete contracts are feasible. As a result, while finding relational contracts is
mostly a pure exercise in repeated game theory, our analysis still preserves the flavor
and techniques of the mechanism design literature in dynamic environments with full
commitment.44 Yet, it modifies this framework by appending enforcement constraints.
Following Klein and Leﬄer (1981) and Shapiro (1983), a sizable share of the relational
contracting literature analyzes durable goods. A recent advance on this front is Wolitzky
(2010) who studies the dynamic incentives of a seller to cut prices and quantities. Keeping
prices high acts as a commitment to deliver a promised quantity. Although there are many
differences between his setting and ours (we allow public enforcement, non-atomistic
sellers, and focus on the opposite allocation of bargaining power between buyers and
sellers), we share a common interest for the design of dynamic trading procedures under
limited enforcement.
Relational contracting. Stationarity or growing stakes. In an important paper, Levin
(2003) characterizes optimal relational contracts when types are independently distributed
over time, there is no asymmetric information at the time of contracting, and incentives
to renege are evaluated before the realization of the productivity shock in any period.
A major result of his analysis is that optimal relational contracts are stationary when
payoff functions are quasi-linear. This stationarity does not survive with persistent types
and asymmetric information at the time of contracting as in our framework. The enforce-
41Malcomson (2012a) offers an exhaustive survey of this literature. Gibbons (2005b) draws the impli-
cation of this paradigm for organization theory.
42Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995), Iossa and Spagnolo (2009) and
Ishihara (2013) among others contributed to that line of research.
43This quote from Malcomson (2012a) nicely summarizes why the literature on relational contracts
makes no account of Courts: “Relational contracts are concerned with agreements that can be enforced
without resort to courts. The spirit of much of the theory discussed here is that, although an effective
legal system exists, important elements of the relationship cannot be enforced legally because courts do
not have the information to do that.” In this paper, we instead keep an active but imperfect legal system
and assume that trade can be verified when it takes place. Yet, the issue remains of ensuring that it
indeed takes place.
44See the seminal paper by Baron and Besanko (1984) and Battaglini (2005), Pavan, Segal and Toikka
(2012) for most recent vintages.
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ment constraints have now to be written for each cost realization and the possibility of
adopting a take-the-money-and-run strategy makes the optimal contract non-stationary.
This feature of contracting would remain even with any tiny serial correlation of types.
Other papers addressing how types persistence affects relational contracts include Horner
(2002), Fong and Li (2010), Halac (2012), and Malcomson (2012b). Those authors are
interested in how private information of the supplier diffuses over time in environments
with no commitment. The focus is on the amount of pooling that arises endogenously
in earlier periods of the relationship and how it determines non-stationary stakes.45 As-
suming instead full commitment, our mechanism design perspective allows us to address
how types persistence is already enough to generate non-stationarity.
Finally, optimal non-stationary contracts in our framework and, especially their shape
over the growing phase, also shares features found in the reputation literature (Sobel
1985, Ghosh and Ray 1996, Watson 1999 and 2002). Relationships might start “small”
there to ease reputations building when there is uncertainty on traders’ opportunism.46
Other modelings of enforcement. Beyond the literature on relational contracts, en-
forcement has also received some attention in models that stress the limited ability of
Courts to enforce obligations. In that vein, Schwartz and Watson (2004), Doornik (2010)
and Kvaløy and Olsen (2009) study the costs of writing contracts and its consequences
on contract design. Those costs are nevertheless different from the enforcement costs
highlighted above.
Krasa and Villamil (2000, 2003) study the enforcement of financial contracts and show
the optimality of debt contracts when Courts can enforce repayments. As pointed out
by La Porta et al. (1998), ineffective enforcement of financial contracts may follow from
corruption of the legal system or from existing laws that offer little protection to outside
creditors attempting to enforce contracts. We differ from these papers both in terms of
the definition of enforcement we are using and in terms of the role played by Courts.
Compte and Jehiel (2007, 2009) develop the notion of quitting rights in bargaining set-
tings. Quitting rights allow an agent to leave the negotiation at any point in time. In a
mechanism design framework, those rights induce a new constraints that those rights im-
ply are somewhere in between participation and incentive constraints, a point also related
to Forges (1989) and Matthews and Postelwaite (1989). In a general setting, Laffont and
Martimort (2002, Chapter 9) and Guash, Laffont and Straub (2003) in the more specific
context of developing countries present models with moral hazard ingredients that also
discuss how incentive and enforcement constraints interact.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: Necessity. We can rewrite (3.2) in a more explicit form as:
∞∑
s=0
δs(S(qτ+s(θ))− tτ+s(θ)) ≥ S(qτ (θ))− t1,τ (θ)−K ∀τ ≥ 0.
Developing, we get:
(A.1)
(1−δ)δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S(qτ+s+1(θ))−θqτ+s+1(θ)) ≥ (1−δ)θqτ (θ)+U τ (θ)−(1−δ)(t1,τ (θ)+K) ∀τ ≥ 0.
We sum up (A.1) with (3.4) to get (4.1).
Sufficiency. Note first that U0(θ) = 0. If U0(θ) > 0 we can decrease t1,0(θ) by ε > 0 thereby
improving the principal’s payoff without modifying other constraints. If the solution satisfies
the aggregate constraint (4.1) we can define U τ (θ) = 0 and t1,τ (θ) = L for all τ ≥ 0 then
the agent’s enforceability constraints (3.4) hold with equality and we obtain (A.1) from (4.1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: Theorem A.1 below provides a Lagrangian formulation for optimiza-
tion problems with infinitely many constraints, an ingredient that requires careful use of duality
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arguments. We first prepare for the use of this theorem before formulating it and then applying
it to our specific contexts.
Preliminaries. We allow for the possibility that the set of feasible outputs is not all R+, but
an interval of the form [0,Q] , and we denote this set by Q. Denote then by Q∞ the set of
non-negative output sequences q = {qτ}∞τ=0 such that (1− δ)
∑∞
τ=0 δ
τ |qτ | <∞. This is a closed
convex set of the Banach space l1(δ) of all sequences x such that ‖x‖δ ≡ (1−δ)
∑∞
τ=0 δ
τ |xτ | <∞.
The topological dual of this space is l∞, i.e., the space of bounded sequences y such that
‖y‖∞ ≡ sup |yτ | < ∞. Observe also that, for any q such that all components are uniformly
bounded away from zero, the conical hull C(q) = {λ(Q∞−q) ≥ 0} is equal to l∞ whose closure
is l1(δ).
Properties of the maximand and constraints. The participation constraint (3.1) is binding at
the optimum of the principal’s problem, U0(θ) = 0. Taking this into account, we simplify the
objective function accordingly. The maximand in the problem (P∗) so obtained is indeed a
strictly concave and Fre´chet differentiable function defined as:
f∗(q) = (1− δ)δτ
( ∞∑
τ=0
δs(S(qτ )− θqτ )
)
.
The Fre´chet derivative at any q ∈ Q∞ is a linear and continuous operator f∗′(q) such that, for
any h such that q + h ∈ Q∞:
f∗
′
(q)h = (1− δ)δτ
( ∞∑
τ=0
δs(S′(qτ )− θ)hτ
)
.
Turning now to the constrained set, the aggregate enforcement constraint (4.1) at date τ also
defines a convex set since all functions
g∗τ (q) = (1− δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S(qτ+s+1)− θqτ+s+1)− θqτ +M
)
are concave in q for all τ ≥ 0. Let denote by g∗(q) = {g∗τ (q)}τ≥0 the corresponding mapping
from l1(δ) onto itself. This mapping is Fre´chet differentiable with a Fre´chet derivative at any
q ∈ Q∞ which is a linear operator g∗′(q). Indeed consider such q and let h such that q+h ∈ Q∞,
we can easily compute:
g∗
′
τ (q)h = (1− δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S′(qτ+s+1)− θ)hτ+s+1 − θhτ
)
.
Observe that g∗′τ (q) is a bounded continuous operator onto l1(δ) (and so is g∗
′
(q)). Indeed, we
have:
‖g∗′τ (q)h‖δ ≤ (1− δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs sup
q
|S′(q)− θ||hτ+s+1|+ θ|hτ |
)
≤ max{sup
q
|S′(q)− θ|, |θ|}(1− δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs|hτ+s+1|+ |hτ |
)
≤ max{sup
q
|S′(q)− θ|, |θ|}
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δτ+s+1|hτ+s+1|+ (1− δ)δτ |hτ |
)
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which finally gives us
‖g∗′τ (q)h‖δ ≤ N∗‖h‖δ
where N∗ = 2 max
{
supq |S′(q)− θ|, |θ|
}
< +∞ from the fact that |S′| is bounded above over
Q since S is concave and S′(0) < +∞.
Formulation. With help of those notations, we can rewrite the maximization problem in a more
compact form as:
(P∗) : max
q∈Q∞
f∗(q) subject to g∗(q) ≥ 0.47
We now define the Lagrangean of the problem as:
L∗(q, λ) = f∗(q) + λg∗(q) = (1− δ)
∞∑
τ=0
δτ (S(qτ )− θqτ )
+
∞∑
τ=0
λτ
(
(1− δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S(qτ+s+1)− θqτ+s+1)− θqτ +M
))
.
Next Proposition reminds an important result due to Rustichini (1998) that ensures the exis-
tence of a sequence of non-negative Lagrange multipliers λ = {λτ}∞τ=0 that lies in l1(δ) for the
problem (P∗) so that an optimal solution q∗ to (P∗) satisfies:
L∗(q∗, λ) ≥ L∗(q, λ) ∀q ∈ Q∞.
Theorem A.1 (Rustichini, 1998, Theorem 6.6.) Take a sequence q∗ in the interior of Q∞
such that g(q∗) ≥ 0 which is an optimal solution to (P∗) with f and g Fre´chet differentiable and
concave, and suppose that the continuous operator g′(q∗) maps l1(δ) onto itself. Then, there
exists a non-negative Lagrange multiplier λ which is an element of l1(δ) such that:
(A.2) λg∗(q∗) = 0, 48
(A.3) f∗′(q∗) + λg∗
′
(q∗) = 0.
The fact that g∗′(q∗) maps l1(δ) onto as shown above allows us to apply this theorem and
conclude that Lagrange multipliers exist in l1(δ)
Optimization. The following optimality condition w.r.t. qτ for τ ≥ 0 can be written as:
(A.4) S′(qτ (θ))− θ − λτθ +
(
τ−1∑
s=0
λs
)
(S′(qτ (θ))− θ) = 0.
47We adopt the standard convention that vector inequalities should be understood as being taken
coordinate wise.
48We also use the convention that the product equality xy = 0 should be understood coordinate wise
as xτyτ = 0 for all τ ≥ 0.
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This condition can be further simplified as:
(A.5) S′(qτ (θ)) = θ +
λτθ
1 +
∑τ−1
s=0 λs
.
Case 1. qfb(θ) ≤ qe(θ). Then setting λτ = 0 for all τ ≥ 0 yields qτ (θ) = qfb(θ) at all dates τ .
Finally, (4.1) writes as
Γ(qfb(θ), θ) ≥ 0
which holds since qfb(θ) ≤ qe(θ). Note that λ = (0, 0, ..., 0, ...) ∈ l1(δ).
Case 2. qfb(θ) > qe(θ). We look for a sequence of non-negative multipliers {λτ}∞τ=0 in l1(δ)
which altogether with the stationary output qτ (θ) = q
e(θ) at all dates τ implements the optimal
solution. Because qfb(θ) > qe(θ) > qdb(θ), there exists λ0 > 0 and λ0 <
1
δ − 1 such that we can
write:
(A.6) S′(qe(θ)) = θ(1 + λ0).
More generally, consider thus the sequence λ = {λτ}∞τ=0 defined recursively through the follow-
ing condition inherited from (A.5);
(A.7) λτ =
(
S′(qe(θ))
θ
− 1
)(
1 +
τ−1∑
s=0
λs
)
.
From there, let us now define the sequence Λ = {Λτ}∞τ=0 of cumulated multipliers as:
Λτ =
τ−1∑
s=0
λs.
From (A.6), we have Λ1 = λ0 > 0. Moreover, (A.7) can be written as:
Λτ+1 + 1 =
S′(qe(θ))
θ
(Λτ + 1) .
or equivalently:
Λτ + 1 =
(
S′(qe(θ))
θ
)τ−1
(Λ1 + 1) =
(
S′(qe(θ))
θ
)τ
.
It follows from this latter equation and the fact that S′(qe(θ)) > θ that Λτ is strictly increasing.
This implies that the multiplier λτ is positive at all dates τ . Indeed, we have:
λτ =
(
S′(qe(θ))
θ
)τ (S′(qe(θ))
θ
− 1
)
.
Finally, λ ∈ l1(δ) when δS
′(qe(θ))
θ < 1; a condition that holds since q
e(θ)) > qdb(θ). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 2: Observe that
U0(θˆ) = U τ (θˆ)− δτ (1− τ)(t1,τ (θˆ)− L) + δτU τ (θˆ) ∀θˆ ∈ Θ.
Using this condition, we rewrite (3.5) as:
U0(θ) ≥ U0(θˆ) + δτ (1− τ)(t1,τ (θˆ)−L)− δτU τ (θˆ) + (θˆ− θ)qτ (θˆ) ∀(θ, θˆ)2 ∈ Θ2, ∀τ ≥ 0.
Permuting the roles of θ and θˆ and manipulating the latter condition yields:
(A.8) δτ
(
U τ (θ)− (1− τ)(t1,τ (θ)− L)
) ≥ U0(θˆ)−U0(θ)+(θ−θˆ)qτ (θ) ∀(θ, θˆ)2 ∈ Θ2, ∀τ ≥ 0.
Let now multiply (A.1) by δτ to get:
(A.9)
(1−δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S(qτ+s+1(θ))− θqτ+s+1(θ))− θqτ (θ) +M
)
≥ δτ (U τ (θ)− (1− δ)(t1,τ (θ)− L)) .
Taken together (A.8) and (A.9) are compatible if and only if:
(1−δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S(qτ+s+1(θ))− θqτ+s+1(θ))− θqτ (θ) +M
)
≥ max
θˆ∈Θ
{U0(θˆ)−U0(θ)+(θ−θˆ)qτ (θˆ)}
(where (3.6) holds) which can be rewritten as (5.1).
We rewrite Lemma 2 by developing those constraints as:
Lemma A.1 An incentive compatible mechanism C is enforceable if and only if the following
aggregate enforcement constraints hold at all dates τ ≥ 0:
(A.10) Ψ(θ,qτ (θ)) ≥ max
{
δ−τ∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ (θ)), 0
}
,
(A.11) Ψ(θ,qτ (θ)) ≥ max
{
δ−τ∆θ(q
τ
(θ)− q0(θ)), 0
}
,
(A.12)
min
{
δτΨ(θ,qτ (θ)) + ∆θqτ (θ); ∆θq0(θ)
}
≥ max
{
−δτΨ(θ,qτ (θ)) + ∆θqτ (θ); ∆θq0(θ)
}
.
Proof. The incentive compatibility conditions (3.6) imply:
(A.13) ∆θq0(θ) ≥ U0(θ)− U0(θ) ≥ ∆θq0(θ).
Inserting the second (resp. first) of these inequalities into (5.1) taken for θ = θ (resp. taken for
θ = θ) yields (A.10) (resp. (A.11)).
Finally, there exist values of U0(θ) − U0(θ) that satisfy (A.13) and (5.1) if and only if the
following condition holds:
(A.14)
min
{
(1− δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S(qτ+s+1(θ))− θqτ+s+1(θ))− θqτ (θ) +M
)
+ ∆θq
τ
(θ); ∆θq0(θ)
}
≥
max
{
−(1− δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S(qτ+s+1(θ))− θqτ+s+1(θ))− θqτ (θ) +M
)
+ ∆θq
τ
(θ); ∆θq0(θ)
}
.
This latter condition can be written in a more compact form as (A.12).
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Theorem 2: Consider problem (P). We first neglect the enforcement constraints
(5.3), (A.11) and (A.12) and only consider, as usual in the screening literature, the participation
constraint (3.1) for type θ and the incentive constraint (3.6) for type θ. Of course, those two
constraints are binding at the optimum of the so relaxed problem. The corresponding optimal
outputs are stationary and respectively given by qfb(θ) and qbm(θ) < qfb(θ). It is routine to
check the remaining participation and incentive constraints. Turning now to (5.3), it becomes:
(A.15) δτψ(θ, qfb(θ)) ≥ max
{
∆θqbm(θ)− (1− δτ )∆θqfb(θ); 0
}
.
Developing, we obtain the following pair of inequalities:
(A.16) ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) ≥ 0,
(A.17) ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) ≥ δ−τ∆θ(qbm(θ)− qfb(θ)).
Because qbm(θ) < qfb(θ), the right-hand side of (A.17) is maximum at τ = 0. Manipulating
leads to the first inequality in (6.1) which in turn implies (A.16).
Observe that (A.11) now becomes:
δτψ(θ, qbm(θ)) ≥ max
{
(1− δτ )∆θqbm(θ)−∆θqfb(θ); 0
}
.
Developing, we obtain the following pair of inequalities:
(A.18) ψ(θ, qbm(θ)) ≥ 0,
(A.19) ψ(θ, qbm(θ)) ≥ δ−τ∆θ(qbm(θ)− qfb(θ)).
Because qbm(θ) < qfb(θ), the r.h.s. of (A.20) is maximum at τ = 0 and thus
(A.20) ψ(θ, qbm(θ)) ≥ −∆θqfb(θ).
which in turn is implied by (A.18).
Turning now to (A.12). This condition becomes:
min
{
δτψ(θ, qbm(θ)) + ∆θ(1− δτ )qfb(θ); ∆θqfb(θ)
}
≥ max
{
−δτψ(θ, qfb(θ)) + ∆θ(1− δτ )qbm(θ); ∆θqbm(θ)
}
.
When (6.1) holds, the min on the l.h.s. and the the max on the r.h.s. are achieved for τ = +∞
so that the condition becomes qfb(θ) ≥ qbm(θ) which holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: When restricted to stationary contracts, the principal’s problem
expressed in per-period payoff and output becomes:
(P) : max
{(q(θ),U(θ))}θ∈Θ
Eθ (S(q(θ))− θq(θ)− U(θ)) subject to (6.3) and
(A.21) U(θ) ≥ U(θ) + ∆θq(θ),
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(A.22) U(θ) ≥ 0
where we restrict the constrained set to the relevant binding incentive and participation con-
straints (checking ex post that omitted constraints are satisfied). Of course, (A.21) and (A.22)
are both binding at the optimum. Inserting those expressions of the rent into the maximand and
denoting by Λ the non-negative multiplier of the enforcement constraint (6.3), we may rewrite
the Lagrangean of the corresponding problem as:
L(q,Λ) = Eθ (S(q(θ))−m(θ)q(θ)) + Λ
(
ψ(θ, q(θ))−∆θq(θ))
where q = (q(θ),q(θ)) and where the virtual cost parameter m(θ) is such that m(θ) ={
θ if θ = θ,
θ + ν1−ν∆θ if θ = θ.
The objective and constraint are both concave with the constrained
set obviously satisfying the Slater condition. The Karush-Khu¨n-Tucker conditions for optimal-
ity are then necessary and sufficient to characterize the optimal outputs given by (6.4) and
(6.5). Of course, Λ > 0 because (6.6) holds. Otherwise, we would get a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3: Preliminaries. We first consider a relaxed problem (P) with only
(3.6) taken for θ = θ and (3.1) taken for θ = θ. We are thus neglecting (3.6) taken for θ = θ
and (3.1) taken for θ = θ that will both be checked ex post. Second, we neglect (A.11) and
(A.12) which are checked ex post.
Of course, the participation constraint (3.1) taken for θ = θ and the incentive constraint (3.1)
taken for θ = θ must both be binding at the optimum of the so relaxed (P). Inserting the
expression U0(θ) = ∆θq0(θ) into the maximand allows us to simplify the objective function
accordingly. The maximand in the problem (P) so obtained is indeed a strictly concave and
Fre´chet differentiable function defined as:
f(q) = Eθ
(
(1− δ)δτ
( ∞∑
τ=0
δs(S(qτ (θ))−m(θ)qτ (θ))
))
.
Properties of the maximand and constraints. The sequence q = (q(θ),q(θ)) lies in the Banach
space l1(δ)× l1(δ) which is the cross product of the spaces of sequences considered in the proof
of Theorem 1. Let us thus endow the Banach space l1(δ) × l1(δ) with the obvious product
topology and the norm ‖q(θ)‖ = ∑θ∈Θ ‖q(θ)‖δ.
The Fre´chet derivative of f at any q = (q(θ),q(θ)) ∈ Q∞ ×Q∞ is a linear and continuous
operator f ′(q) such that, for any h = (h(θ),h(θ)) with q + h ∈ Q∞ ×Q∞:
f ′(q)h = Eθ
(
(1− δ)δτ
( ∞∑
τ=0
δs(S′(qτ (θ))−m(θ))hτ (θ)
))
.
Turning now to the constrained set, the aggregate enforcement constraint (A.23) at date τ
also defines a convex set since all functions
gτ (q) = δ
τΨ(θ,qτ (θ))−max
{
∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ (θ)), 0
}
are concave in q for all τ ≥ 0. Let denote by g(q) = {gτ (q)}τ≥0 the corresponding mapping
from l1(δ)× l1(δ) onto l1(δ).
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We now assume that the r.h.s. of (5.3) is positive. We will check ex post that this is indeed
the case at the optimum. Thus, (5.3) can be rewritten as:
(A.23) gτ (q) = δ
τΨ(θ,qτ (θ))−∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ (θ)).
The mapping gτ (q) so defined is obviously Fre´chet differentiable with a Fre´chet derivative
at any q ∈ Q∞ which is a linear operator g∗′(q). Indeed consider such q and let h such that
q + h ∈ Q∞, we can easily compute:
g′τ (q)h = (1− δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S′(qτ+s+1(θ))− θ)hτ+s+1(θ)− θhτ (θ)
)
−∆θ(1− δ)
( ∞∑
s=0
δshs(θ)−
τ−1∑
s=0
δshs(θ
)
.
Observe that g′τ (q) is a bounded continuous operator. Indeed, following steps similar to those
in the proof of Theorem 1, we have:
‖g′τ (q)h‖ ≤ ∆θ
(‖h(θ)‖δ + ‖h(θ)‖δ)+(1−δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs sup
q
|S′(q)− θ||hτ+s+1(θ)|+ θ|hτ (θ)|
)
≤ N‖h‖
with N = ∆θ + max
{
supq |S′(q)− θ|, |θ|
}
< +∞ from the fact that S′ is bounded above over
Q since S is concave and S′(0) < +∞.
Formulation. With those compact notations, we rewrite the maximization problem as:
(P) : max
(q)∈Q∞×Q∞
f(q) subject to g(q) ≥ 0.
The corresponding Lagrangean becomes
L(q, λ) = f(q) + λg(q) = Eθ
(
(1− δ)
( ∞∑
τ=0
δτ (S(qτ (θ))− θ˜(θ)qτ (θ))
))
+
∞∑
τ=0
λτ
(
δτΨ(θ,qτ (θ))−max
{
∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ (θ)), 0
})
.
Optimization. First, observe that, because λ ∈ l1(δ), we have also
∑∞
s=0 λs < +∞. We can now
explore the implications of (A.3). The following first-order conditions hold:
1. Optimality w.r.t. qτ (θ)
(A.24) S′(qτ (θ))− θ =
λτθ −
(∑∞
s=τ+1 λs
)
∆θ
ν +
∑τ−1
s=0 λs
.
2. Optimality w.r.t. qτ (θ)
(A.25)
{
S′(qτ (θ))− θ = ν+
∑∞
s=0 λs
1−ν ∆θ if S
′(0) ≥ θ + ν+
∑∞
s=0 λs
1−ν ∆θ,
qτ (θ) = 0 otherwise.
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Observation 1. We necessarily have qτ (θ) ≤ qbm(θ) and the inequality is strict provided one
multiplier at least is positive, something we know is true when condition (6.6) holds.
Observation 2. Because λτ ≥ 0 and
∑∞
s=0 λs < +∞, we necessarily have limτ→+∞ λτ = 0.
Inserting into (A.24), it follows that:
(A.26) lim
τ→+∞S
′(qτ (θ)) = θ.
The first-best output for a low-cost seller is implemented in the limit.
Non-stationarity. We prove that the contract cannot be stationary. Suppose the contrary.
Then, (A.26) implies that necessarily, qτ (θ)) = q
fb(θ) for all τ . Turning to (A.24), it implies
that λτ = 0 for all τ which from (A.25) also implies qτ (θ) = q
bm(θ) for all τ .
Inserting these expressions of the outputs into (5.3), we obtain that (A.15) should hold at all
τ . But this condition does not hold at date 0 from Assumption 6.6.
Binding enforcement constraints. We now investigate the structure of the binding enforcement
constraints.
Case 1. Suppose that all constraints (A.23) are binding. We rewrite (A.23) taken at dates τ
and τ + 1 respectively as:
(A.27) Ψ(θ,qτ (θ)) = δ
−τ∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ (θ))
(A.28) δΨ(θ,qτ+1(θ)) = δ
−τ∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ+1(θ)).
By substracting (A.28) from (A.27), we obtain:
δS(qτ+1(θ))− θqτ (θ) + (1− δ)M = ∆θqτ (θ).
Simplifying yields that the sequence qτ (θ) must satisfy the recursive condition (6.7) for all pairs
τ and τ + 1 for which (A.23) is binding.
Case 1.1. Fix q0(θ) ≤ qe(θ). Because Φ is increasing and Φ(qe(θ)) = qe(θ), the whole sequence
q(θ) defined by (6.7) is (weakly) increasing and such that:
(A.29) qτ (θ) ≤ qe(θ) ∀τ ≥ 0.
Observe that condition (6.6) implies
ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) < ∆θqbm(θ) < ∆θqfb(θ)
which amounts to
qe(θ) < qfb(θ).
This inequality taken together with (A.29) yields a contradiction with (A.26).
Case 1.2. q0(θ) > q
e(θ). Using the (strict) concavity of S, (6.7) implies:
δS′(qe(θ))(qτ+1(θ)− qe(θ)) > θ(qτ (θ)− qe(θ))
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and thus
qτ (θ)− qe(θ)) >
(
θ
δS′(qe(θ))
)τ
(q0(θ)− qe(θ))
Since qe(θ) > qdb(θ), we have θ
δS′(qe(θ))
> 1, the sequence q(θ) defined by (6.7) then diverges
towards +∞. This is again a contradiction with (A.26).
Case 2. Not all constraints (A.23) are binding. Since Case 1 above cannot arise, we conjecture
a solution where (A.23) is binding for all dates τ ≤ τ∗ for some τ∗ ≥ 0 and slack for τ > τ∗, i.e.,
λτ ≥ 0 for τ ≤ τ∗ and λτ = 0 for τ ≥ τ∗ + 1. We are now going to construct the corresponding
non-negative multipliers and outputs accordingly.
Observe first that (A.24) and the fact that λτ = 0 for τ ≥ τ∗ + 1 altogether imply:
(A.30) S′(qτ (θ)) = θ ∀τ ≥ τ∗ + 1.
The optimal output of the low-cost seller is first-best from date τ∗ + 1 on.
Let us now define the sequence Λ of cumulative multipliers as:
Λτ =
τ−1∑
s=0
λs
with our previous convention that Λ0 = 0. Because all multipliers λs are non-negative, this
sequence is by definition non-decreasing and non-negative with terminal value Λτ∗+1 = Λ∞.
From the optimality condition (A.24), the sequence Λ satisfies the recursive equation:
(S′(qτ (θ))− θ) (ν + Λτ ) = (Λτ+1 − Λτ )θ − (Λ∞ − Λτ+1) ∆θ.
After manipulations, we get:
(A.31) θΛτ+1 −∆θΛ∞ = ν(S′(qτ (θ))− θ) + S′(qτ )Λτ .
We are looking for a sequence such that λτ = Λτ+1−Λτ > 0 for all τ ≤ τ∗ and λτ = Λτ+1−Λτ =
0 for τ ≥ τ∗ + 1 . This implies also that the sequence q(θ) is such that the recursive condition
(6.7) holds for all dates τ ≤ τ∗.
Observe also that (A.24) implies
S′(qτ∗(θ)) = θ +
θλτ∗
ν + Λ∞ − λτ∗ ≥ θ
and thus
qτ∗(θ) ≤ qfb(θ).
Consider qτ∗(θ) ∈
[
Γ(qfb(θ)), qfb(θ)
)
. Starting from such qτ∗(θ), we may then construct the
following recursive sequence of outputs Γ(qτ∗(θ)) = qτ∗−1(θ), and thus Γs(qτ∗(θ)) = qτ∗−s(θ)
(or Γτ
∗−s(qτ∗(θ)) = qs(θ)) for s ≤ τ∗ where Γk denotes the k-th iteration of the mapping Γ).
By construction, this sequence qτ (θ) for all τ ≤ τ∗ is thus increasing in τ . Moreover, that
qe(θ) ≤ Γ(qfb(θ)) < qfb(θ) with qe(θ) = Γ(qe(θ)) implies also that:
(A.32) qe(θ) ≤ qτ (θ) ∀τ ≤ τ∗ − 1.
We can rewrite (A.31) as
(A.33) Λτ+1 = ατΛτ + βτ
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with
(A.34) ατ =
S′(qτ (θ))
θ
and βτ =
∆θΛ∞ + ν(S′(qτ (θ))− θ)
θ
.
Observe that qτ (θ) > q
e(θ) > qfb(θ) by assumption which implies that ατ < 1 for all τ . Also,
qτ+1(θ) < q
fb(θ) implies that βτ > 0 for all τ .
As long as the sequence Λ is monotonically increasing (so that the multipliers λτ remain non-
negative) for a given sequence of outputs satisfying (6.7) for τ ≤ τ∗ and qτ∗(θ) ∈
[
Γ(qfb(θ)), qfb(θ)
)
,
we have the solution. Slightly abusing notations, we will thus consider an arbitrary sequence sat-
isfying (A.33) and study its monotonicity properties. In this respect, define now two sequences
C and Λ˜ such that:
Λτ = Cτ Λ˜τ and Λ˜τ+1 = ατ Λ˜τ .
Observe that it is just a normalization to set Λ˜0 = 1 provided that C0 is conveniently adjusted.
From this, we immediately obtain:
Λ˜τ = Π
τ−1
s=0αs.
Inserting into (A.33) then yields:
Cτ+1 − Cτ = γτ where γτ = βτ
Πτs=0αs
.
From which we get:
Cτ = C0 +
τ−1∑
s=0
γs
where C0 is a constant to be found. Finally, we obtain:
(A.35) Λτ =
(
C0 +
τ−1∑
s=0
γs
)
Πτ−1s=0αs.
This expression leads us immediately to:
Λτ+1
Λτ
= ατ
C0 +
∑τ
s=0 γs
C0 +
∑τ−1
s=0 γs
.
Because βτ > 0, γτ > 0 and thus
C0+
∑τ
s=0 γs
C0+
∑τ−1
s=0 γs
> 1. Hence, the ratio Λτ+1Λτ is the product of two
terms, one ατ being less than one while the second is greater than one. Observe that
Λτ+1
Λτ
≥ 1
when
C0 ≤ vτ = γτατ
1− ατ −
τ−1∑
s=0
γs.
The sequence vτ is monotonically decreasing whenever:
(A.36)
γτ
1− ατ ≥
γτ+1ατ+1
1− ατ+1 .
Notice that
γτ+1 =
γτβτ+1
ατ+1βτ
.
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Inserting into (A.36), we see that vτ+1 ≤ vτ if and only if
(A.37)
βτ
1− ατ ≥
βτ+1
1− ατ+1 .
We have:
βτ
1− ατ =
∆θΛ∞ + ν(S′(qτ (θ))− θ)
θ − S′(qτ (θ))
Because, starting from any q0(θ) > q
e(θ), the sequence qτ (θ) defined by the recursive equation
(6.7) is monotonically increasing in τ and qτ (θ) > q
e(θ) > qfb(θ) for all τ , the sequence βτ1−ατ
is monotonically decreasing in τ . Thus, the sequence vτ is also monotonically decreasing. It
implies that, for any τ∗ ≥ 1 there always exists a non-empty interval of values for C0 such that:
(A.38) vτ∗ ≤ C0 ≤ vτ∗−1.
For such C0, the monotonicity of vτ implies that
C0 < vτ ′ ∀τ ′ ≤ τ∗ − 1 and C0 > vτ ′ ∀τ ′ ≥ τ∗.
For such values of C0,
Λτ ′+1
Λτ ′
≥ 1 ∀τ ′∗ − 1 and Λτ ′+1
Λτ ′
< 1 ∀τ ′ ≥ τ∗.
Hence, by choosing C0 such that (A.38) holds, the sequence Λτ achieves its maximum at τ
∗.
We thus have:
Λτ∗ = Λ∞.
Taking C0 = vτ∗ and using the definition of Λτ∗ coming from (A.35), we obtain the following
condition linking Λ∞ and τ∗
(A.39) Λ∞ =
Πτ
∗
s=0αs
1− ατ∗ γτ
∗(Λ∞) =
βτ∗(Λ∞)
1− ατ∗
where we make explicit the dependence of γτ∗ , and βτ∗ on Λ∞ from (A.34) explicit.
Denote η(τ∗,Λ∞) the r.h.s. of (A.39). Observe that η(τ∗, 0) > 0 and that (A.39) has a unique
solution Λτ
∗
∞ > 0. Moreover, (A.37) implies that Λτ
∗
∞ is an increasing sequence in τ∗. From this,
we may as well define the step function τ∗(Λ∞) with the convention that τ∗(Λτ
∗
∞) = τ∗.
We conclude that, whenever Λ∞ ∈
[
Λτ
∗
∞ ,Λτ
∗+1∞
)
, the sequence Λ satisfying (A.33) and such
that Λτ∗ = Λ∞ is monotonically increasing over the first τ∗ periods.
To find the value of Λ∞ at the optimum, remember that we are conjecturing an optimal
contract with all enforcement constraints (A.23) being binding for τ ≤ τ∗(Λ∞) and slack for
τ > τ∗(Λ∞). The fact that those constraints are all binding for τ ≤ τ∗(Λ∞) implies that the
low-cost seller’s outputs follow the recursive sequence Γ(qτ (θ)) = qτ−1(θ) with qτ∗(Λ∞)(θ) (or
alternatively q0(θ) such that q0(θ) = Γ
τ∗(Λ∞)(qτ∗(Λ∞)(θ))) to be found. the fact that (A.23) is
binding at all date τ ≤ τ∗(Λ∞) and slack thereafter, so that qτ (θ) = qfb(θ) for τ > τ∗(Λ∞), we
can rewrite the binding constraint (A.23) at date τ∗(Λ∞) to get the following condition:
(A.40) δ(S(qfb(θ))− θqfb(θ))− (1− δ)θqτ∗(Λ∞)(θ) + (1− δ)M = ϑ(Λ∞)
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where
ϑ(Λ∞) = δ−τ
∗(Λ∞)∆θ
q(θ,Λ∞)− (1− δ) τ∗(Λ∞)−1∑
s=0
δsqs(θ)

and where from (A.25), we make explicit the dependence of q(θ,Λ∞) on Λ∞ as:
(A.41) S′(q(θ,Λ∞)) = θ +
ν + Λ∞
1− ν ∆θ
where we assume that S′(0) is large enough so that q(θ,Λ∞) remains nonnegative. Observe
that q(θ,Λ∞) is decreasing with Λ∞. Observe also that ϑ is strictly decreasing on each interval[
Λk∞,Λk+1∞
)
where τ∗(Λ∞) = k remains constant. At a discontinuity point of ϑ, say Λτ+1∞ , where
τ∗(Λ∞) jumps from τ to τ + 1; we have ϑ(Λτ+1−∞ ) ≥ ϑ(Λτ+1∞ ) if and only if:
δ−τ∆θ
(
q(θ,Λτ+1∞ )− (1− δ)
τ−1∑
s=0
δsqs(θ)
)
≥ δ−τ−1∆θ
(
q(θ,Λτ+1∞ )− (1− δ)
τ∑
s=0
δsqs(θ)
)
,
or equivalently
(A.42) q(θ,Λτ+1∞ ) ≤ δτqτ (θ) + (1− δ)
τ−1∑
s=0
δsqs(θ).
Now observe that qτ (θ) ≥ qe(θ) for all τ . Hence, the r.h.s. of (A.42) is bounded below by qe(θ).
Finally, the second condition in condition 6.6 implies that qe(θ) ≥ qbm(θ). Since qbm(θ) ≥
q(θ,Λτ+1∞ ), (A.42) immediately follows. Hence, ϑ has a jump downwards at the discontinuity
point Λτ+1∞ . There are of course only a countable number of such discontinuities. We conclude
that ϑ is everywhere decreasing. Moreover, we have τ∗(0) = 0 and thus ϑ(0) = ∆θqbm(θ) > 0
while, for Λ∞ large enough, q(θ,Λ∞) < qe(θ) < (1−δ)
∑τ∗(Λ∞)−1
s=0 δ
sqs(θ) so that ϑ(Λ∞) < 0 for
such Λ∞. Hence, there exists Λ
sup∞ such that ϑ(Λ∞) ≥ 0 ∀Λ∞ ≤ Λsup∞ . Let denote the possible
discontinuity (open) interval as: Jτ =
(
ϑ(Λτ+1∞ ), ϑ(Λτ+1−∞ )
)
.
Two cases (mutually exclusive) have now to be considered.
Case 1. Suppose that there exists Λ∗∞ such that A) Λτ is an increasing sequence with max Λτ =
Λτ∗ = Λ
∗∞ and B) qτ∗(Λ∞)(θ) ∈
[
Γ(qfb(θ)), qfb(θ)
)
is such that (A.40) holds. From condition
6.6 , the r.h.s. above is positive and less than ∆θqbm(θ). Hence, Λ∗∞ is positive, less than Λ
sup∞
and 0 < τ∗(Λ∗∞) < +∞. Starting from the values qτ∗(Λ∞)(θ) and Λ∗∞, we can reconstruct the
sequences of outputs qτ (θ) for τ ≤ τ∗(Λ∞)−1 and the corresponding cumulative multipliers Λτ
which in turn fully determines the positive multipliers λτ for τ ≤ τ∗(Λ∗∞).
Case 2. Suppose that there exists τ∗ such that
(A.43) ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) ∈ Jτ∗ .
Because there is a countable set of discontinuities for ϑ, this case almost never arises. When it
does, one must adjust the value of qτ∗(θ) so that (A.40) holds for τ
∗ and Λ∗∞ = Λτ∗∞ .
For further references, we note qsb(θ) = q(θ,Λ∗∞) as defined in (A.41) and qsbτ (θ) = qτ (θ) where
the latter sequence is defined recursively for τ ≤ τ∗(Λ∗∞) through (6.7) with qτ∗(Λ∗∞)(θ) = qfb(θ).
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Checking the omitted constraints. It is routine to check that (3.6) for θ and (3.1) for θ
are both satisfied.
From the fact that ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) > 0 (i.e., qfb(θ) < qe(θ)), the r.h.s. of (5.3) is strictly positive
for all τ ≤ τ∗(Λ∞) so gτ can be written as (A.23) as conjectured.
Now we check the remaining enforcement constraints. First, (A.11) amounts to
δτψ(θ, qsb(θ)) ≥ max
{
∆θ((1− δτ )qsb(θ)− qsb0 (θ)), 0
}
.
Observe that qsb(θ) < qbm(θ) < qe(θ). Thus,
(A.44) ψ(θ, qsb(θ)) > ψ(θ, qbm(θ)) > 0
where the last inequality follows from the assumption qfb(θ) ≤ qe(θ). Observe also that
(A.45) δτψ(θ, qsb(θ)) ≥ ∆θ((1− δτ )qsb(θ)− qsb0 (θ))
since
δτψ(θ, qsb(θ)) ≥ 0 ≥ ∆θ(qsb(θ)− qsb0 (θ))
where the last inequality follows from the fact that qsb(θ) < qbm(θ) < qeτ (θ) for all τ and the
first inequality follows from qsb(θ) < qbm(θ) < qe(θ) < qe(θ). Finally (A.44) and (A.45) taken
altogether ensures that (A.11) holds.
Observe that (A.12) now amounts to
min
{
δτψ(θ, qsb(θ)) + ∆θqsb
τ
(θ); ∆θqsb0 (θ)
}
≥ max
{
−δτΨ(θ, qsbτ (θ)) + ∆θ(1− δτ )qsb(θ); ∆θqsb(θ)
}
.
Several cases should be considered.
1. Observe that qsb(θ) < qbm(θ) < qe(θ) implies
∆θqsb0 (θ) ≥ ∆θqe(θ) ≥ ∆θqsb(θ).
2. Note that Ψ(θ, qsbτ (θ)) ≥ 0. Thus, we have
∆θqsb0 (θ) ≥ −δτΨ(θ, qsbτ (θ)) + ∆θqsb(θ) > −δτΨ(θ, qsbτ (θ)) + ∆θ(1− δτ )qsb(θ).
3. We have ψ(θ, qsb(θ)) ≥ 0. Thus, we get:
δτψ(θ, qsb(θ)) + ∆θqsb
τ
(θ) ≥ −δτΨ(θ, qsbτ (θ)) + ∆θ(1− δτ )qsb(θ).
4. Observe that the following string of inequalities holds:
δτψ(θ, qsb(θ)) + ∆θqsb
τ
(θ) ≥ δτψ(θ, qsb(θ)) + ∆θ(1− δτ )qsbτ (θ)
≥ δτψ(θ, qsb(θ)) + ∆θ(1− δτ )qe(θ) ≥ δτψ(θ, qsb(θ)) + ∆θ(1− δτ )qbm(θ)
≥ δτψ(θ, qbm(θ)) + ∆θ(1− δτ )qbm(θ) = ∆θqbm(θ) + δτ
(
ψ(θ, qbm(θ))−∆θqbm(θ)
)
≥ ∆θqsb(θ)
where the last inequality follows from ψ(θ, qbm(θ)) ≥ ∆θqbm(θ) in (6.6).
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Finally, note also that (A.11) follows from (A.12). Indeed (A.12) implies
δτΨ(θ,qτ (θ)) + ∆θqτ (θ) ≥ ∆θq0(θ).
Because q0(θ) ≥ qτ (θ) and q0(θ) ≥ qτ (θ) we have
δτΨ(θ,qτ (θ)) + ∆θq0(θ) ≥ δτΨ(θ,qτ (θ)) + ∆θqτ (θ) ≥ ∆θq0(θ) ≥ ∆θqτ (θ).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: From the Proof of Lemma A.1, the fact that the enforcement
constraint (5.3) is binding at a given date τ ≤ τ∗ implies that all constraints below are also
binding at that date:
(A.46) U0(θ) ≥ U0(θ) + ∆θqτ (θ)− δτ (U τ (θ)− (1− δ)(t1,τ (θ)− L)),
(A.47) U0(θ) = U0(θ)−∆θqτ (θ)− δτ (U τ (θ)− (1− δ)(t1,τ (θ)− L)),
(A.48)
(1−δ)δτ
(
δ
∞∑
s=0
δs(S(qτ+s+1(θ))− θqτ+s+1(θ))− θqτ (θ) +M
)
≥ δτ (U τ (θ)− (1− δ)(t1,τ (θ)− L)) .
Pre-delivery payments. The Proof of Lemma A.1 taken in tandem with the Proof of Theo-
rem 3 also show in passing that there is no loss of generality in choosing pre-delivery payments
that satisfy (6.11), provided that U
sb
τ (θ) − (1 − δ)(tsb1,τ (θ) − L) ≥ 0, i.e., U sbτ (θ) remains non-
negative.
Payments to the high-cost seller. Remember that (3.1) and (3.6) are respectively binding
and slack for θ = θ and the output of such high-cost type is stationary. Without loss of generality,
we take a stationary payment satisfying (6.12). Then, we get
(A.49) U
sb
τ (θ) = 0 ∀τ.
Observe that this stationary payment satisfies the enforcement constraints (A.46) and
(A.50) U τ (θ) ≥ (1− δ)(t1,τ (θ)− L)
which, taking into account that (A.49) and (6.11), rewrite respectively as
(A.51) U
sb
0 (θ) = ∆q
sb(θ) ≥ ∆θqsb
τ
(θ) ∀τ,
and
(A.52) U
sb
τ (θ) ≥ 0 ∀τ.
We already know from the Proof of Theorem 3 that U
sb
τ (θ) = δ
−τ∆θ(qsb(θ) − qsb
τ
(θ)) ≥ 0 for
τ ≤ τ∗. Hence, (A.51) holds for all τ ≤ τ∗ and a fortiori for τ > τ∗. Condition (A.52) is
trivially satisfied.
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Payments to the low-cost seller. From the fact that (A.47) is binding at the optimal
contract and the fact that (3.1) and (3.6) are respectively binding for θ = θ and θ = θ, we get:
(A.53) U
sb
τ (θ) = δ
−τ∆θ(qsb(θ)− qsb
τ
(θ)) ∀τ ≤ τ∗.
From the Proof of Theorem 3, we also know that U
sb
τ (θ) = δ
−τ∆θ(qsb(θ) − qsb
τ
(θ)) ≥ 0 for
τ ≤ τ∗. From the definition of U sbτ (θ), we have:
U
sb
τ (θ) = (1− δ)(tsbτ (θ)− θqsbτ (θ)) + δUτ+1(θ).
Inserting the expression of U
sb
τ (θ) and U
sb
τ+1(θ) obtained from (A.53) as long as τ ≤ τ∗ − 1, we
get (6.13).
Let us look for a stationary payment tsbτ (θ) ≡ tsb(θ) for τ ≥ τ∗. We can rewrite the binding
incentive constraint (3.6) for θ = θ as:
U
sb
0 (θ) = (1− δ)
τ∗−1∑
s=0
δs(tsbs (θ)− θqsbs (θ)) + (1− δ)
+∞∑
τ∗
δs(tsbτ (θ)− θqsbs (θ)).
Taking into account that U
sb
0 (θ) = ∆θ(q
sb(θ), we finally obtain (6.14). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: From (A.40) and the fact that qτ∗(Λ∞)(θ) < qfb(θ), we get:
δ(S(qfb(θ))−θqfb(θ))−(1−δ)qτ∗(Λ∞)(θ)+(1−δ)M < δ(S(qfb(θ))−θqfb(θ))−(1−δ)θqfb(θ))+(1−δ)M
= δ−τ
∗(Λ∞)∆θ
q(θ,Λ∞)− (1− δ) τ∗(Λ∞)−1∑
s=0
δsqs(θ)
 ≤ δ−τ∗∆θ (qbm(θ)− (1− δτ∗)qe(θ))
where the last inequality follows from the fact that qbm(θ) ≥ q(θ,Λ∞) and qs(θ) ≥ qe(θ) for all
s ≤ τ∗. From this, it follows that:
δ−τ
∗
∆θ(qbm(θ)− qe(θ)) ≥ ψ(θ, qfb(θ)).
Manipulating this inequality and taking the closest higher integer gives the r.h.s. of (6.15).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: There is exactly one round in the growing phase when the con-
ditions of optimality with respect to outputs and the binding constraint (A.40) for τ∗ = 0
defines a unique positive λ0. Coming back on the optimality conditions w.r.t. q0(θ) and q0(θ)
respectively and making the dependence of those outputs on λ0 explicit, we rewrite:
(A.54) S′(q0(θ, λ0))− θ = λ0
ν
θ,
(A.55) S′(q0(θ, λ0))− θ = ν + λ0
1− ν ∆θ.
Making the dependence of those outputs on λ0 explicit, the fact that (A.40) is binding for τ
∗ = 0
can now be rewritten as:
(A.56) δ
(
S(qfb(θ))− θqfb(θ)
)
+ (1− δ)M = ∆θq0(θ, λ0) + (1− δ)θq0(θ, λ0).
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Solving the system (A.54)-(A.55)-(A.56) yields λ0 > 0 when condition (6.6) holds.
On the other hand, (A.40) is slack for τ ≥ 1 when it is already slack at τ = 1, i.e., when:
(A.57) δS(qfb(θ))− θqfb(θ) + (1− δ)M ≥ δ−1 (∆θq0(θ, λ0)− (1− δ)∆θq0(θ, λ0)) .
Taken together, (A.56) and (A.57) imply:
(A.58) q0(θ, λ0) ≤ Γ(qfb(θ)).
This condition ensures that there is a unique round on the growing phase:
Denote x = δ(S(qfb(θ))−θqfb(θ))+(1− δ)M = ψ(θ, qfb(θ))+(1− δ)θqfb(θ) and observe that
λ0 is actually a decreasing function of x only. The condition (A.58) can thus be rewritten as:
(A.59) q0(θ, λ0(ψ(θ, q
fb(θ))) + (1− δ)θqfb(θ)) ≤ Γ(qfb(θ)) = 1
θ
(ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) + θqfb(θ)).
Let us fix ψ(θ, qfb(θ)) and δ such that (A.59) holds. Increasing δ and decreasing accordingly M
ensures that (A.59) still holds so that the growing phase has still one period only.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4: Consider the case where only condition (6.2) holds. Our optimization
cannot rule out the possibility that both (5.3) and (A.12) are binding.49 In fact, it is enough
to include in our optimization a simplified version of (A.12) namely:
(A.60) δτΨ(θ,qτ (θ)) + ∆θqτ (θ) ≥ ∆θq0(θ).
Denoting by µ the sequence of multipliers for constraints (A.60), the Lagrangean becomes:
L(q, λ, µ) = Eθ
(
(1− δ)
( ∞∑
τ=0
δτ (S(qτ (θ))− θ˜(θ)qτ (θ))
))
+
∞∑
τ=0
λτ
(
δτΨ(θ,qτ (θ))−
(
∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ (θ))
))
+
∞∑
τ=0
µτ
(
δτΨ(θ,qτ (θ))−
(
∆θ(q0(θ)− qτ (θ))
))
.
Optimization. We proceed as in the Proof of Theorem 3 and thus much details are omitted.
The following first-order conditions hold:
1. Optimality w.r.t. qτ (θ)
S′(qτ (θ))− θ =
λτθ −
(∑∞
s=τ+1 (λs + µs)
)
∆θ
ν +
∑τ−1
s=0 λs
;
2. Optimality w.r.t. qτ (θ)
S′(qτ (θ))− θ = (ν +
∑∞
s=0 λs) ∆θ + µτθ
1− ν +∑τ−1s=0 µs
49 From Item 5. in the Proof of Theorem 3, we already know that (A.11) is implied by (A.12).
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Observation 1. Because λτ , µτ ≥ 0 and
∑∞
s=0 λs < +∞ and
∑∞
s=0 (λs + µs) < +∞ we
necessarily have limτ→+∞ λτ = 0. Inserting into the first-order condition, we get (7.1).
Observation 2. Note that now the output of the inefficient seller is not necessarily stationary
but, yet, (7.2) holds.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: The following Lemma fully characterizes incentive compatible and in-
dividually rational allocations
(
U0(θ), q0(θ)
)
.
Lemma A.2 U0(θ) is convex, absolutely continuous and satisfies:
(A.61) U0(θ)− U0(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
q0(x)dx
with q0(θ) satisfiying (3.7) and
(A.62) U0(θ) ≥ 0.
Proof. Observe that U0(θ) is the maximum of linear functions and as such is convex. Convexity
implies that q0(θ) should be weakly decreasing. Absolute continuity follows from an argument
in Milgrom and Segal (2002). This property immediately implies (A.61). Last, the participation
constraint (3.1) can be reduced to satisfying (A.62) only because U0(θ) is weakly decreasing.
Condition (7.4) is then obtained by inserting (A.61) into (5.1).
Observe that the maximand on the r.h.s. of (7.4) is a concave function of θˆ since q0(θ) is
weakly decreasing by (3.7). It achieves its maximum at θˆ∗τ (θ) such that
q0(θˆ
∗
τ (θ)) = qτ (θ).
Because q0(θ) > qτ (θ), we necessarily have θˆ
∗
τ (θ) > θ at all θ < θ.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5: We just want to check that (7.4) holds for the Baron-Myerson allo-
cation (U bm(θ), qbm(θ)). To this end, observe that the r.h.s. can be rewritten as:
ϕ(τ, θ) = δ−τ max
θˆ∈Θ
{∫ θˆ
θ
qbm(x)dx+ (θ − θˆ)(1− δτ )qbm(θ)
}
.
The above maximand is a concave function of θˆ since qbm(θ) is weakly decreasing with a uniform
distribution. It achieves its maximum at θˆ∗τ (θ) such that
qbm(θˆ∗τ (θ)) = (1− δτ )qbm(θ)
so that θˆ∗τ (θ) > θ immediately follows. Treating (somewhat abusively) τ as a continuous vari-
able, we get:
(A.63)
∂ϕ
∂τ
(τ, θ) = −lnδ
(
ϕ(τ, θ) + (θ − θˆ∗τ (θ))qbm(θ)
)
.
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Because qbm(θ) is weakly decreasing, we have:
∫ θˆ∗τ (θ)
θ
qbm(x)dx+ (θ − θˆ∗τ (θ))(1− δτ )qbm(θ) ≤ (θˆ∗τ (θ)− θ)δτqbm(θ).
Therefore,
ϕ(τ, θ) + (θ − θˆ∗τ (θ))qbm(θ) ≤ 0.
Inserting into (A.63) yields:
∂ϕ
∂τ
(τ, θ) ≤ 0.
Hence, (7.4) holds for the Baron-Myerson allocation at any τ ≥ 0 when it holds at τ = 0, which
means:
(A.64) ψ(θ, qbm(θ)) ≥ max
θˆ∈Θ
{∫ θˆ
θ
qbm(x)dx
}
≡
∫ θ
θ
qbm(x)dx, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Now, let us define:
Z(θ) = ψ(θ, qbm(θ))−
∫ θ
θ
qbm(x)dx.
We get:
Z˙(θ) = (δS′(qbm(θ))− θ)q˙bm(θ) = (δ(θ − θ)− (1− δ)θ) q˙bm(θ) ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from δS′(qbm(θ))−θ ≤ 0 when qbm(θ) ≥ qdb(θ) for all θ (second
part of condition (7.5)), and the fact that qbm(θ) is weakly decreasing. Hence, (A.64) holds if
it holds at θ as requested by (7.5). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: Observe that, for a stationary contract, the maximand on the r.h.s. of
(7.4) can be rewritten as:
ϕ(τ, θ) = δ−τ max
θˆ∈Θ
{∫ θˆ
θ
q(x)dx+ (θ − θˆ)(1− δτ )q(θ)
}
where q(θ) is weakly decreasing by (3.7). One can again show that the maximand above is
achieved at θˆ∗τ (θ) such that
q(θˆ∗τ (θ)) = (1− δτ )q(θ)
and that we necessarily have θˆ∗τ (θ) > θ at all θ < θ.
Proceeding as in the Proof of Theorem 5, one can show that (7.4) holds for a stationary
allocation at any τ ≥ 0 when it holds at τ = 0, which can be rewritten as (7.6). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 6: The principal’s objective is again to maximize the expected dis-
counted net surplus that she withdraws from trade,
(P) : max
C
(1− δ)
∞∑
τ=0
δτ
∫ θ
θ
(S(qτ (θ))− t1,τ (θ)− t2,τ (θ)) dF (θ)
subject to individual rationality, incentive compatibility and enforcement constraints. When
restricted to stationary contracts, this problem can be rewritten in terms of per-period payoffs
as follows:
(Pst) : max
(U(θ),q(θ))∈A
∫ θ
θ
(S(q(θ))− θq(θ)− U(θ)) dθ
∆θ
subject to (7.6)
where A is the set of admissible stationary allocations defined as follows:
Definition A.1 A stationary allocation (U(θ), q(θ)) is admissible if and only if q(θ) is piece-
wise continuous and it satisfies (3.7), (A.62) and (A.61) or equivalently
(A.65) U˙(θ) = −q(θ).
(Pst) is a control problem with a mixed constraint (7.6) which links both the state variable
U and the control q.50 The Hamiltonian can be written as:
H(θ, U, q, λ) = (S(q)− θq − U) 1
∆θ
− λq
where λ is the co-state variable associated with (A.65), while the Lagrangian writes as
L(θ, U, q, λ, µ) = H(θ, U, q, λ) + µ(ψ(θ, q)− U)
where µ is the multiplier of the mixed constraint (7.6).
First, observe that the Hamiltonian and the expression ψ(θ, q) − U are both concave in
(U, q) for all θ. Hence, the necessary conditions for optimality of a program with mixed con-
straint (Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987, Theorem 1, p. 276) are also sufficient conditions of the
Mangasarian type (Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987, Theorem 5, p. 287). The admissible pair
(U(θ), q(θ)) is thus optimal if and only if there exist a continuous and piecewise continuously
differentiable function λ(θ) and a piecewise continuous function µ(θ) such that the following
conditions hold.
1. Optimality w.r.t. output:
(A.66) (S′(q (θ))− θ) 1
∆θ
+ µ(θ)(δS′(q (θ)))− θ) = λ(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
2. Condition on the co-state variable:
(A.67) λ˙(θ) =
1
∆θ
+ µ(θ), for a.e. θ ∈ Θ.
3. Boundary and transversality conditions:
(A.68) λ(θ) = 0 and U(θ¯) = 0.
50 Filippov-Cesari Existence Theorem can be used to prove existence of a solution to this optimal
control problem with mixed constraint (Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987, Theorem 2, p. 285). Proof
available upon request.
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4. Complementarity slackness:
(A.69) µ(θ) ≥ 0, ψ(θ, q(θ))− U(θ) ≥ 0 and µ(θ)(ψ(θ, q(θ))− U(θ)) = 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Some important facts follow from the analysis of our problem.
1. Using (A.67) and (A.68) immediately yields the expression of the adjoint variable:
(A.70) λ (θ) =
θ − θ
∆θ
+ Ψ(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, where Ψ(θ) = ∫ θθ µ (ξ) dξ.
2. It is also convenient to rewrite condition (A.66) as:
(A.71) S′(q(θ)) (1 + δµ(θ)∆θ) = 2θ − θ + θµ(θ)∆θ + Ψ(θ)∆θ ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Whenever (7.6) is slack and µ(θ) = 0, we get:
(A.72) S′(q(θ)) = 2θ − θ + Ψ(θ)∆θ.
In particular, continuity of the optimal output at θˆ implies:
(A.73) S′(qˆ) = 2θˆ − θ + Ψ(θˆ)∆θ.
3. On any interval with non-empty interior where (7.6) is binding, differentiating w.r.t. θ
yields:
(A.74) q˙(θ)(δS′(q(θ))− θ) = 0.
We now conjecture the form of a solution with q(θ) being continuous and we then check the
optimality conditions above.
• On the interval Θ1 = [θ, θˆ] over which the allocation entails some bunching q(θ) = qˆ
(so that (A.74) holds), (7.6) is binding, and µ(θ) ≥ 0. In particular, we have µ(θ) ≥ 0.
Equations (A.66) and (A.68) then yield:(
S′(qˆ)− θ) 1
∆θ
+ µ(θ)
(
δS′(qˆ)− θ) = λ(θ) = 0
and thus
(A.75) δS′(qˆ)− θ ≤ δS′(qˆ)− θ ≤ 0 ≤ S′(qˆ)− θ ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Finally, (7.6) being binding at θˆ, we get:
(A.76) ψ(θˆ, qˆ) =
∫ θ
θˆ
q(x)dx.
• On the interval Θ2 = (θˆ, θ], (7.6) is slack and µ(θ) = 0. From (A.72), we get:
(A.77) S′(q(θ)) = 2θ − θ + Ψ(θˆ)∆θ ∀θ ∈ Θ2
so that q(θ) is weakly decreasing on Θ2. Second, together with the continuity of q(θ) at
θˆ, it also ensures that
(A.78) S′(qˆ) = 2θˆ − θ + Ψ(θˆ)∆θ ≥ 2θ − θ + Ψ(θˆ)∆θ ∀θ ≤ θˆ.
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Inserting also µ(θ) = Ψ˙(θ) into (A.71) gives us:
(A.79) (θ − δS′(qˆ))Ψ˙(θ) + Ψ(θ) = 1
∆θ
(
S′(qˆ)− θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ1.
Taking into account that Ψ(θ) = 0 yields the solution to this differential equation:
(A.80) Ψ(θ) =
(S′(qˆ)− θ) (θ − θ)
(θ − δS′(qˆ))∆θ .
Differentiating this function, and taking into account the conditions (A.75) yields the expression
of the non-negative Lagrange multiplier:
(A.81) µ(θ) =
(S′(qˆ)− θ) (θ − δS′(qˆ))
(δS′(qˆ)− θ)2 ∆θ ≥ 0
Finally, to ensure that the output so constructed is optimal, we need to show that (7.6) also
holds for all θ ∈ Θ2. To this end, note that ψ(θˆ, q(θˆ)) − U(θˆ) = 0 and that the derivative of
ψ(θ, q(θ)) − U(θ) w.r.t. θ is equal to q˙(θ) (δS′(q(θ))− θ) . Because q˙(θ) < 0, this derivative is
positive when q(θ) ≥ qdb(θ) for all θ. This gives the result.
We are now ready to describe the solution to (Pst).
1. The enforcement constraint (7.6) is always slack. Theorem 5 then shows that the
Baron-Myerson allocation is optimal.
2. The enforcement constraint (7.6) is binding on the lower tail. When (7.7) holds, the
Baron-Myerson output no longer satisfies (7.6). There must be some bunching for the
efficient types and the optimal solution is of the form (7.8) with θˆ > θ and qˆ < qfb(θ).
The parameters θˆ, Ψ(θˆ) and qˆ are solutions to the system (A.73), (A.76) and (A.80).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 6 : Starting from any stationary contract with a per-period positive
output profile q1(θ), let construct a new contract where only date 0-output is modified (referred
to as an almost stationary contract in the sequel) as:
q0(θ) = q1(θ)− ε
for some ε ≥ 0 small enough. Lemma A.2 together with a binding participation constraint
(A.62) at θ then fully determines the whole rent profile.
First, observe that the enforcement constraint (7.4) for date 0 can be rewritten as:
ψ(θ, q1(θ)) + (1− δ)θε ≥ max
θˆ∈Θ
{∫ θˆ
θ
q1(x)dx− (1− δ)(θˆ − θ)ε
}
, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
The maximum on the above r.h.s. is still achieved at θ provided q1(θ) + ε remains positive
which is true when ε is small enough. Thus (7.4) for date 0 becomes:
(A.82) ψ(θ, q1(θ)) ≥
∫ θ
θ
q1(x)dx− (1− δ)θε, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
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Second, (7.4) for all τ ≥ 1 is kept unchanged:
ψ(θ, q1(θ)) ≥ δ−τ max
θˆ∈Θ
{∫ θˆ
θ
q1(x)dx− (1− δ)ε(θˆ − θ) + (1− δ)(θ − θˆ)q1(θ)− (1− δ)ε(θˆ − θ)
}
= δ−τ max
θˆ∈Θ
{∫ θˆ
θ
q1(x)dx+ (1− δ)(θ − θˆ)q1(θ)
}
∀θ ∈ Θ.
Using an argument similar to one made in the proof of Theorem 5, the above r.h.s. is maximum
for τ = 1 so that (7.4) for date 1 on can be rewritten as:
(A.83) ψ(θ, q1(θ)) ≥ ϕ(1, θ) = δ−1 max
θˆ∈Θ
{∫ θˆ
θ
q1(x)dx+ (1− δ)(θ − θˆ)q1(θ)
}
∀θ ∈ Θ.
Still from the proof of Theorem 5, we know that∫ θ
θ
qst(x)dx ≥ δ−1 max
θˆ∈Θ
{∫ θˆ
θ
qst(x)dx+ (1− δ)(θ − θˆ)qst(θ)
}
∀θ ∈ Θ
with a strict inequality on an interval [θ, θˆ + η] for η small enough. Hence the most stringent
enforcement constraint between (A.82) and (A.83) is still (A.82) when ε is small enough. Taking
stock of this observation, expressing the intertemporal rent as U0(θ) =
∫ θ
θ ((1 − δ)q0(x) +
δq1(x))dx =
∫ θ
θ q1(x)dx− (1−δ)ε(θ−θ) and integrating by parts, we can rewrite the principal’s
problem as when restricted to almost stationary contracts as:
max
(ε,q1(θ))
(1−δ)
∫ θ
θ
(S(q1(θ)− )−S(q1(θ))− (2θ−θ)ε) dθ
∆θ
+
∫ θ
θ
(S(q1(θ))− (2θ − θ)q1(θ)) dθ
subject to (A.82).
If the optimal mechanism is stationary the solution to this problem is (ε = 0, q1(θ) = q
st(θ)).
Let us first fix ε and denote by W(ε) the objective function so obtained after optimization
w.r.t. q1(θ). We evaluate the derivative W ′(ε) of this objective w.r.t. ε at ε = 0 and thus
q1(θ) = q
st(θ). A simple application of the Envelope Theorem yields:
W ′(0) = −(1− δ)
(∫ θ
θ
(
S′(qst(θ))− (2θ − θ)) dθ
∆θ
−Ψ(θˆ)θ
)
.
Taking into account the expression of qst(θ) yields:
(A.84) W ′(0) = −(1− δ)
(∫ θˆ
θ
2
(
θˆ − θ
) dθ
∆θ
−Ψ(θˆ)θ
)
From (A.80) and (A.78), we get:
Ψ(θˆ)
(
θ − δ(2θˆ − θ + Ψ(θˆ)∆θ)
)
= 2
(θˆ − θ)2
∆θ
.
Inserting into (A.84) yields:
W ′(0) = (1− δ)
2
Ψ(θˆ)
(
θ + δ(2θˆ − θ + Ψ(θˆ)∆θ)
)
> 0.
Hence, offering a quasi-stationary contract with q0(θ) < q
st(θ) improves the buyer’s intertem-
poral welfare.
Q.E.D.
